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By enacting § 2 [of the Federal Arbitration Act] . . . Congress precluded
States from singling out arbitration provisions for suspect status, requiring instead that such provisions be placed “upon the same footing as
1
other contracts.”

INTRODUCTION
Jamie Leigh Jones, a Halliburton employee working in Iraq, was
2
drugged and gang-raped by her coworkers. When she sought justice
in court, Halliburton argued that her sexual assault claims had to be
3
arbitrated pursuant to a clause in her employment contract.
African American consumers alleging racial discrimination against
a car dealership discover that they are each required to pay some
$14,000 in fees up front just to have their less-than-$180,000 claims
1

Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996) (quoting Scherk v.
Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 511 (1974)).
2
James Risen, Limbo for U.S. Women Reporting Iraq Assaults, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13,
2008, at A1.
3
Id. at A10. The Fifth Circuit recently held that Jones may bring her sexual harassment claims in court despite the agreement. Jones v. Halliburton Co., 583 F.3d
228, 242 (5th Cir. 2009).
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4

heard in arbitration. Filing the same action in federal court would
5
have cost them each $350.
The National Arbitration Forum (NAF), which until recently arbitrated debt-collection disputes between financial institutions and consumers, earned “at least $5 million in fees between 1998 and 2000”
6
from one such financial institution alone. In the same period, that
7
financial institution allegedly won 99.6% of its 50,000 NAF cases.
8
These and other “arbitration horror stories” have fueled a polarizing debate within academia, in legislatures, and among ordinary
individuals—individuals who increasingly find themselves surrendering their right to trial by jury just to obtain a job or basic services like a
credit card or health care. Some see in this development the ugly
specter of predatory corporations herding the unwary into secret trials
9
and “kangaroo court[s].” Others worry that latent prejudices about
arbitration have produced exaggerated suspicions that are belied by a
10
more complex and balanced reality.
In response to real or perceived abuses, state lawmakers have increased their efforts to regulate arbitration. After all, arbitration is a
11
“creature of contract,” and states have been the primary stewards of
contract law. Thus, Nebraska requires form contracts containing a
binding arbitration clause to provide a prominent disclosure of the
4

JOHN O’DONNELL, PUBLIC CITIZEN, THE ARBITRATION TRAP: HOW CREDIT CARD
COMPANIES ENSNARE CONSUMERS 35 (2007), available at http://www.citizen.org/
documents/ArbitrationTrap.pdf. These figures do not include attorneys’ fees.
5
Id. at 36.
6
Arbitration or “Arbitrary”: The Misuse of Mandatory Arbitration to Collect Consumer
Debts: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Domestic Policy of the H. Comm. on Oversight &
Gov’t Reform, 111th Cong. 4 (2009) (statement of F. Paul Bland, Jr., Staff Attorney,
Public Justice), available at http://oversight.house.gov/images/stories/Hearings/
pdfs/20090722Bland.pdf.
7
Id. In July 2009, the Minnesota Attorney General’s Office filed a civil action
against the NAF for fraud and deceptive practices, alleging that the NAF had a financial
interest in some of these institutions, as well as in the law firms that represented them.
See Complaint at 1-2, Minnesota v. Nat’l Arbitration Forum, Inc., No. 09-18550 (Minn.
Dist. Ct. July 14, 2009), available at http://www.ag.state.mn.us/PDF/PressReleases/
SignedFiledComplaintArbitrationCompany.pdf (describing the NAF’s affiliations).
8
See generally ARBITRATION HORROR STORIES, http://arbitrationhorrorstories.
wordpress.com (last visited Feb. 15, 2011) (cataloguing similar incidents). A casual
perusal of the Internet reveals no shortage of similar forums.
9
See In re Soto, 165 N.E.2d 855, 857 (N.Y. 1960) (Froessel, J., dissenting); John
Vail, Big Business Acts the Bully, NAT’L L.J., Aug. 4, 2008, at 22.
10
See, e.g., Thomas E. Carbonneau, “Arbitracide”: The Story of Anti-Arbitration Sentiment in the U.S. Congress, 18 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 233, 253, 261-62 (2007).
11
E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Rhone Poulenc Fiber & Resin Intermediates,
S.A.S., 269 F.3d 187, 194 (3d Cir. 2001).
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12

clause in capitalized, underlined letters. California refuses to enforce
awards rendered by arbitrators who fail to disclose certain conflicts of
13
interest. Kansas forbids predispute arbitration agreements between
14
employers and employees. To some, these seem like reasonable measures that help level the playing field and protect vulnerable parties.
According to the Supreme Court’s current jurisprudence, howev15
er, the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) displaces almost all of these
16
state initiatives under the doctrine of implied obstacle preemption.
The dominant explanation for this result is that the FAA’s purpose is
to further the parties’ freedom of contract, by “rigorously en17
forc[ing]” arbitration clauses according to their terms. Given the
supremacy of federal law, this interpretation of the FAA leaves state
legislatures with precious little wiggle room to regulate such clauses,
particularly in the “mandatory” binding arbitration area. It results in
the overpreemption of state law, which cynics attribute to “the Court’s

12

NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-2602.02 (2008).
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1281.9, 1286.2(a)(6)(A) (West 2007).
14
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 5-401(c)(2) (2001).
15
9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2006).
16
According to David Schwartz, from January 2002 to April 2004, courts held that
the FAA preempted almost fifty different state laws. See David S. Schwartz, State Judges
as Guardians of Federalism: Resisting the Federal Arbitration Act’s Encroachment on State Law,
16 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 129 app. A (2004) [hereinafter Schwartz, State Judges].
Schwartz estimates that, due to the effect of precedent, “[t]his [statistic] suggests that
hundreds of state laws are held preempted each year.” David S. Schwartz, The Federal
Arbitration Act and the Power of Congress over State Courts, 83 OR. L. REV. 541, 549 n.29
(2004) [hereinafter Schwartz, Power of Congress].
17
Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 220-21 (1985); see also Julius
Henry Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12 VA. L. REV. 265,
277-78 (1926) (“The primary purpose of the [FAA] is to make enforceable in the Federal courts such agreements for arbitration . . . .”); Christopher R. Drahozal, In Defense
of Southland: Reexamining the Legislative History of the Federal Arbitration Act, 78 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 101, 102 (2002) (“In Southland, the Court effectively ‘federalized’ United
States arbitration law, ‘restrict[ing] state legislative rights’ so as ‘to guarantee the unobstructed enforcement of arbitration agreements.’” (quoting THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF ARBITRATION 162 (2d ed.
2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Stephen L. Hayford, Federal Preemption and
Vacatur: The Bookend Issues Under the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act, 2001 J. DISP. RESOL.
67, 71 (explaining that “the enforcement of contractual agreements to arbitrate” is the
“seminal purpose of the FAA”); Stephen J. Ware, Punitive Damages in Arbitration: Contracting Out of Government’s Role in Punishment and Federal Preemption of State Law, 63
FORDHAM L. REV. 529, 571 (1994) (“A state law that limits freedom of contract with
respect to arbitration agreements conflicts with the FAA and is preempted by it.”).
13
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own self-interested goal of reducing the number of cases pending in
18
the federal courts.”
At the same time, the dominant view leaves the door ajar for
judges to police arbitration agreements through standard contract law
defenses to enforceability. For this reason, state courts have been
viewed as “guardians” against the FAA’s relentless colonization of state
19
law domains.
But empirical and anecdotal evidence increasingly
suggests that those courts may have started taking the offensive, by distorting easily manipulable rules such as the unconscionability doctrine
in order to accomplish the very same regulation of arbitration agreements that the FAA appears to have declared off-limits to state legisla20
tures. Because the prevailing view is that established rules of contract do not offend the FAA as long as they “arose to govern issues
concerning the validity, revocability, and enforceability of contracts
21
generally,” such judicial maneuvering has largely managed to fly under the radar. Ironically, this leaves existing FAA preemption
jurisprudence prone to the opposite charge of underpreemption.
In this Article, I seek to inject a fresh perspective on these prob22
lems. Rather than a “broad principle of enforceability” for arbitration clauses, I argue that the Court’s FAA preemption jurisprudence
reflects a core principle of nondiscrimination in enforcement. On this
view, the central purpose of FAA preemption is to reverse what is perceived to be the law’s longstanding yet irrational hostility toward arbitration. That hostility manifested itself—and, according to the Court,
continues to manifest itself—in legal rules that deny arbitration
agreements the equal opportunity of enforcement enjoyed by other
23
contracts. Countless lower courts and commentators have likewise
24
grasped the anti-discrimination logic of FAA preemption. But none
18

Larry J. Pittman, The Federal Arbitration Act: The Supreme Court’s Erroneous Statutory
Interpretation, Stare Decisis, and a Proposal for Change, 53 ALA. L. REV. 789, 830 (2002); see
also Casarotto v. Lombardi (Lombardi I), 886 P.2d 931, 941 (Mont. 1994) (Trieweiler,
J., specially concurring), vacated, 515 U.S. 1129 (1995); Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or
Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court’s Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH.
U. L.Q. 637, 661 (1996).
19
See, e.g., Schwartz, State Judges, supra note 16, at 143-47.
20
See infra notes 207-09 and accompanying text.
21
Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987).
22
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 11 (1984).
23
See H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1 (1924); see also Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006) (“To overcome judicial resistance to arbitration, Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act . . . [which] places arbitration agreements on
equal footing with all other contracts . . . .” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)).
24
See infra notes 177-85 and accompanying text.
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has ventured beyond the occasional, one-line reference to the FAA as
25
an “anti-discrimination statute” or as a “a sort of ‘equal protection’
26
clause for arbitration provisions” in order to explain the meaning
behind that logic.
27
This is the first of two articles in which I attempt to fill this void.
To be clear, the anti-discrimination theory of FAA preemption that I
seek to defend is grounded primarily in the Court’s jurisprudence rather than in the FAA itself. Although anti-discrimination themes are
certainly evident in the text and history of the statute, the language of
the FAA is simply too indeterminate, and the congressional record
leading to its enactment too sparse, to draw any firm conclusions about
its original meaning. There is also considerable doubt as to whether
Congress ever intended the FAA to preempt state substantive law (rather than simply to provide rules for the streamlined enforcement of
28
arbitration agreements in federal court). What is undeniable, however, is that courts routinely deploy the rhetoric of anti-discrimination
when justifying the FAA’s displacement of state law. My approach is
therefore to interrogate those justifications and to question whether
they necessitate the outcomes the Court tells us they do.
Unlike the dominant view, an anti-discrimination approach would
not require the preemption of all state legislation restricting the use
of arbitration agreements. From an anti-discrimination perspective,
even laws that facially discriminate against certain historically oppressed groups are not always problematic. This is captured by the
well-known concept of a “suspect” or “quasi-suspect” classification in
equal protection law. Such classifications are suspicious because we
have good reason to fear the persistence of hostility and prejudice.
But the fact that they are “suspect” rather than “forbidden” means
that those classifications may sometimes be tolerated where necessary
to serve overriding public interests. Similarly, an anti-discriminationinspired model of FAA preemption would displace state law only if the
law could be said to discriminate improperly against arbitration—that

25

Joshua Ratner & Christian Turner, Origin, Scope, and Irrevocability of the Manifest
Disregard of the Law Doctrine: Second Circuit Views, 24 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 795, 797-98
(2006).
26
David Ling, Preserving Fairness in Arbitration Agreements: States’ Options after Casarotto, 2 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 193, 193 (1997).
27
The companion piece is Hiro N. Aragaki, Equal Opportunity for Arbitration, 58
U.C.L.A. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (on file with author).
28
See infra notes 210-13 and accompanying text.
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is, if it betrayed the same anti-arbitration bias or “mistrust” of the
29
arbitral process that the FAA was designed to abolish.
But anti-discrimination law also understands that discrimination
operates in subtle ways; just because a law is general on its face does not
mean it cannot do harm as applied. Anti-discrimination law has accordingly developed a number of evidentiary frameworks to distinguish between the legitimate and pretextual applications of facially neutral laws.
I argue that similar frameworks, when adapted to the FAA context, may
help address the concerns of those who fear the advent of a “new judi30
cial hostility” in the way that some courts seem to use the unconscionability defense against arbitration agreements.
Disillusionment with the Court’s strong pro-arbitration leanings
has understandably led some to elide the anti-discrimination underpinnings of FAA preemption. But it leads me rather to highlight those
underpinnings for two reasons. First, as a descriptive matter, antidiscrimination is the organizing principle that best explains the
Court’s FAA preemption jurisprudence over the past twenty-five years.
We are stuck with this jurisprudence; instead of fighting it or wishing
it away, advocates on both ends of the political spectrum would do
better to lay bare its true meaning. Second, even if the assumptions
behind the principle are no longer appropriate, the Court and lower
courts continue to rely on a norm of anti-discrimination to legitimize
the FAA’s preemptive compass. I argue that a more sophisticated engagement with that norm offers a way to lend integrity to the law of
FAA preemption, by holding courts to the full implications of their
own pronouncements.
This Article proceeds as follows: In Part I, I offer an account of
certain basic features of the Court’s FAA preemption jurisprudence
to set the stage for my broader normative claims. In Part II, I argue
that the deeper logic of the Court’s FAA jurisprudence (including its
FAA preemption jurisprudence) is not one of enforcing arbitration
agreements as written, but rather of ensuring that state laws do not
improperly discriminate against arbitration. I explain why that jurisprudence implicitly regards any classification that disadvantages

29

Cf. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 231-32 (1987); Stephen L. Hayford & Alan R. Palmiter, Arbitration Federalism: A State Role in Commercial
Arbitration, 54 FLA. L. REV. 175, 194-95 (2002).
30
See Steven J. Burton, The New Judicial Hostility to Arbitration: Federal Preemption,
Contract Unconscionability, and Agreements to Arbitrate, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 469, 483.
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arbitration as “suspect,” and thus why arbitration itself deserves a
31
kind of “suspect” status.
When viewed through an anti-discrimination lens, the Court’s
FAA preemption jurisprudence appears both too restrictive and too
permissive. I argue in Part III that it is too restrictive because it
assumes that a state law impermissibly discriminates simply because it
singles out arbitration on its face. In Part IV, I argue that it is too
permissive: it does not go far enough to protect arbitration because it
is too aloof to the problem of discrimination in application.
My contention emphatically is not that arbitration agreements
should be considered a “suspect” or “quasi-suspect” class under equal
protection law. Nor is it my purpose to vindicate an independent descriptive claim about the existence of discrimination against arbitration or to develop substantive rules for remedying any such discrimination. Rather, it is to borrow from the more refined conceptual
resources developed in the anti-discrimination area to introduce a
more sophisticated way of thinking about FAA preemption. In doing
so, I hope to lay the foundations for an alternative approach, one that
helps restore a balance between the states’ legitimate regulatory inter32
ests and the so-called “national policy favoring arbitration.”

31

In using the term “suspect,” I do not intend to suggest a particular correspondence with the notion of a “suspect” class or a “quasi-suspect” class, or with the degree
of suspicion (or scrutiny) that they trigger.
Note also that my use of the term “suspect” is slightly different from the term “suspect status” in the quotation from the Court’s seminal Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto opinion with which this Article began. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. The
Court in that case appears to say that state judges and legislatures should not regard
arbitration agreements as suspicious simply because they are arbitration agreements.
Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687-88 (1996). By contrast, I use the
phrase to suggest that we should regard any state law to be suspicious if it purposefully
disadvantages arbitration agreements. Although this does not appear to be the way
most courts and commentators have understood the Court’s phrase, some have also
used the term “suspect” in this way. See, e.g., 2 IAN R. MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW § 16.2.4 (Supp. 1999) (referring to the Court’s anti-arbitration holding
in Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953), as “suspect” because it rested on “outmoded
hostility”); Thomas H. Riske, No Exceptions: How the Legitimate Business Justification for
Unconscionability Only Further Demonstrates California Courts’ Disdain for Arbitration Agreements, 2008 J. DISP. RESOL. 591, 603 (describing a court’s unconscionability finding
against an arbitration agreement as “suspect” because it betrayed a “general prejudice
against arbitration”).
32
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984).

ARAGAKI REVISED FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

Arbitration’s Suspect Status

4/13/2011 1:27 PM

1241

I. THE EXISTING FAA PREEMPTION PARADIGM
The Court’s FAA preemption jurisprudence is based entirely on
33
section 2 of the FAA, which provides, in pertinent part: “A written
provision . . . to submit [specified disputes] to arbitration . . . shall be
valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at
34
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” In a series of
decisions culminating in Southland Corp. v. Keating, the Court crystallized its interpretation of section 2 as a substantive provision falling
35
within Congress’s broad power to regulate interstate commerce.
As substantive federal legislation, section 2 has the potential to
displace state law in one of several ways. Under the doctrine of
federal preemption, section 2 would preclude the states from legislating in a particular area if (a) Congress had made this intention
explicit in the text of the FAA or (b) Congress’s intention to occupy
the field could be inferred from a comprehensive scheme of federal
36
legislation that leaves little room for concurrent state lawmaking.
37
Neither, however, is the case for section 2.
The only remaining
38
ground for displacing state law is therefore the Supremacy Clause,
pursuant to which federal law trumps any state provision that conflicts
with or “‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution
39
Technically
of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.’”
speaking, this displacement is not a species of preemption at all but
40
rather of supremacy. Nonetheless, it is colloquially referred to as
“conflict” or “obstacle” preemption, and it is also the way in which the
Court finds FAA section 2 to “preempt” state law.
The Court has developed an analytical framework for determining
when FAA section 2 preempts conflicting state laws. I shall refer to
this framework as the “Paradigm.” Christopher Drahozal has provided
33

See Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 447 (2006) (describing FAA section 2 as “the only [FAA] provision that we have applied in state court”).
34
United States Arbitration Act § 2, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
35
See Southland, 465 U.S. at 11; see also Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury
Contr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983); Prima Paint v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S.
395, 405 (1967).
36
See Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 606-07 (1991); Stephen A.
Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767, 775 (1994).
37
See Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S.
468, 477 (1989).
38
U.S. CONST. art. VI.
39
Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861, 873 (2000) (quoting Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
40
See Gardbaum, supra note 36, at 768-69.
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perhaps the most comprehensive account of the Paradigm to date.
My goal in this Part is to present an abbreviated account of the
Paradigm that serves less as an alternative to Drahozal’s than as a
foundation for this Article’s broader normative argument.
My account of the Paradigm is subject to the following simplifying
assumptions. First, I define the Paradigm as limited to section 2
preemption, thereby excluding consideration of other substantive
provisions of the FAA that the Court may later find to have preempt42
ive force. Second, because they are tangential to my argument, I set
aside cases in which the parties have specifically selected state law to
43
govern their arbitration agreement. Third, in order to focus on the
Paradigm’s foundational building blocks, I assume that the universe of
state laws consists only of those that unproblematically fit into one of
the Paradigm’s binary categories: laws that either single out arbi44
tration or apply to “any contract.” Finally, in this Part only, I intend
my account of the Paradigm to be a descriptive explanation of how I
believe most courts (following the Supreme Court’s lead) construe
and apply FAA preemption doctrine, rather than to suggest how the
Paradigm should operate.
A. Enforcement-Neutral and Enforcement-Impeding Laws
FAA section 2 provides that any arbitration agreement falling
within its jurisdictional purview “shall be valid, irrevocable, and
45
A threshold requirement for preemption based on
enforceable.”
section 2, therefore, is that the state law frustrate this imperative of
46
enforceability, either in whole or in part. I refer to such laws as
41

See Christopher R. Drahozal, Federal Arbitration Act Preemption, 79 IND. L.J. 393,
407-19 (2004) (providing a four-step analysis for FAA preemption).
42
Thus, when I say that the FAA preempts a state law, I mean that FAA section 2
preempts the law.
43
In these circumstances, the chosen state law is generally saved from FAA
preemption. See Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489
U.S. 468, 479 (1989). But see Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S.
52, 63-64 (1995) (holding that the parties’ choice of New York law did include that
state’s law prohibiting punitive damage awards in arbitration).
44
9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). This is a crucial limiting assumption of the Article. State
laws that do not fit into those categories have posed some of the most perplexing FAA
preemption problems. Accord Drahozal, supra note 41, at 425. Precisely how an antidiscrimination model of FAA preemption would contend with such state laws is an important question that I take up in Equal Opportunity for Arbitration, supra note 27.
45
9 U.S.C. § 2 (emphasis added).
46
See, e.g., Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 356 (2008) (noting that a state law is in
conflict with the FAA even when it merely “imposes prerequisites to enforcement of an
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47

“enforcement impeding.” By contrast, a state law that does not stand
as an obstacle to the enforceability of arbitration agreements is never
preempted by section 2, even if the law encumbers arbitration in
48
other ways. I refer to such laws as “enforcement neutral.”
Many—but not all—procedural and ethical rules regulating the
practice of arbitration (as opposed to contracts of arbitration) are
49
enforcement neutral. For example, a state law that provides for the
immediate appeal of an order to compel arbitration may burden the
arbitration process by creating further opportunities for delay. But
delay alone has been insufficient to trigger FAA preemption
50
concerns. Because such a law does not frustrate (wholly or partially)
the enforceability of an otherwise valid arbitration agreement, it is
enforcement neutral and therefore not subject to preemption by the
51
On the other hand, a state procedural rule that requires
FAA.
arbitrators to disclose conflicts of interest would be enforcement

arbitration agreement”); Drahozal, supra note 41, at 408 (arguing that a state law that
“invalidate[s] the parties’ arbitration agreement, in whole or in part, conditionally or unconditionally” is preempted); Stephen J. Ware, “Opt-In” for Judicial Review of Errors of Law
Under the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act, 8 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 263, 269 (1997) (“If one
cannot imagine an arbitration agreement that might be rendered unenforceable by the
state law, then one can be nearly certain that the state law safely avoids preemption.”).
47
This definition includes state laws that restrict the enforceability of arbitral
awards beyond the standards for vacatur contained in FAA section 10. Such laws are
enforcement impeding because they provide an indirect avenue for limiting FAA section 2. See infra note 52 and accompanying text.
48
See Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 688 (1996) (explaining that
a state law that “d[oes] not affect the enforceability of the arbitration agreement itself ”
would be consistent with the FAA). But see Sec. Indus. Ass’n v. Connolly, 883 F.2d
1114, 1121 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding that the FAA preempted a state statute that did not
restrict the enforceability of arbitration clauses in securities contracts but only imposed
sanctions upon broker-dealers).
49
See, e.g., New Eng. Energy Inc. v. Keystone Shipping Co., 855 F.2d 1, 4-7 (1st Cir.
1988) (finding no preemption of a state law providing for consolidation of related arbitration proceedings); St. Fleur v. WPI Cable Sys./Mutron, 879 N.E.2d 27, 33-34 (Mass.
2008) (finding no preemption of a procedural rule withholding the right to a jury for
factual determinations on a motion to compel arbitration); Wells v. Chevy Chase Bank,
F.S.B., 768 A.2d 620, 629 (Md. 2001) (finding no preemption of a general appeals statute
that provided a right of immediate appeal from an order compelling arbitration).
50
See, e.g., Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 688; Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S.
213, 219 (1985) (“We . . . reject the suggestion that the overriding goal of the Arbitration Act was to promote the expeditious resolution of claims.”).
51
Note, however, that such a state law may conflict with FAA section 16, which
provides that an appeal may not be taken from an order granting a motion to compel
arbitration. To reiterate, I take no position on the preemption of state law by FAA sections other than section 2. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
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impeding, and hence a candidate for preemption, if it provides that
52
awards rendered in violation of the rule are unenforceable.
Enforcement-impeding laws can take one of several forms. The
first is a statute that unconditionally invalidates an arbitration agreement or some part thereof, such as an Alabama statute that makes all
53
written predispute arbitration agreements unenforceable or the socalled Garrity rule in New York, which prohibits arbitrators from
54
awarding punitive damages.
The second is a law that makes the validity of an arbitration
agreement contingent on compliance with certain requirements.
Prime examples are laws that render arbitration clauses unenforceable
unless the clause is somehow brought to the nondrafting party’s
attention—for instance, by requiring the clause to be written in capital
55
letters next to the signature block of the container contract. Such
statutes do not necessarily invalidate arbitration agreements, only
those that do not comply with the statute’s requirements.
The third type of enforcement-impeding law is one that merely
56
impairs agreements as to the time, place, or manner of arbitration.
For example, many states have enacted statutes voiding out-of-state
forum selection clauses or class action waivers, whether in arbitration
57
or litigation. Assuming severability, such laws do not prevent the
arbitration itself from going forward. Even though they may not
52

See Skinner v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Sec. Corp., No. 03-2625, 2003 WL
23174478, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 29, 2003) (observing that state laws “allow[ing] the
court to vacate arbitral awards entered upon the agreements of the parties is
preempted by the FAA”); Richard C. Reuben, Personal Autonomy and Vacatur After Hall
Street, 113 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1103, 1156 (2009) (observing that state procedural rules,
such as those relating to vacatur of arbitral awards, would survive preemption so long
as they do not “contravene the enforcement provisions of Section 2 of the FAA”). But
see Ovitz v. Schulman, 35 Cal. Rptr. 3d 117, 134-35 (Ct. App. 2005) (holding that California’s arbitrator disclosure rules do not affect enforceability because “[i]f an award is
vacated, the result is not a preclusion of further arbitration, but rather a new arbitration held in accordance with the disclosure requirements”).
53
ALA. CODE § 8-1-41(3) (1993), preemption recognized by Allied-Bruce Terminix
Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 278-81 (1995).
54
See Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 793, 795-96 (N.Y. 1976), superseded by
statute as recognized in Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 5960 (1995).
55
See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-2602.02 (2008), preemption recognized by Affiliated
Foods Midwest Coop., Inc. v. Integrated Distrib. Solutions, LLC, 460 F. Supp. 2d 1068,
1073-74 (D. Neb. 2006).
56
Drahozal refers to such laws as “second generation” state laws. See Drahozal, supra note 41, at 416.
57
See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 20040.5 (West Supp. 2009); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 19-28.1-14 (1998).

ARAGAKI REVISED FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

Arbitration’s Suspect Status

4/13/2011 1:27 PM

1245

directly conflict with the imperative of enforceability contained in
FAA section 2, such laws have nonetheless been deemed a sufficient
58
“obstacle” to that imperative so as to warrant preemption by the FAA.
B. The Single-Out/General Test
Assuming an enforcement-impeding law, the next step in the
preemption analysis is to inquire into the manner in which arbitration
is treated on the face of the statute. The Court has developed a
binary, on/off framework for this analysis. At one pole are “grounds
59
as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” Good
60
examples are rules of contract formation, established contract
61
defenses such as unconscionability, and other “generally applicable”
62
Under current FAA preemption
principles such as estoppel.
63
jurisprudence, such laws generally survive preemption.
58

See Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1136, 1148 (9th Cir. 2003); Bradley v. Harris
Research, Inc., 275 F.3d 884, 890 (9th Cir. 2001); cf. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle,
539 U.S. 444, 458-60 (2003) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that a state court
rule imposing class arbitration where the agreement was silent on the issue should be
preempted).
59
9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
60
See First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995).
61
Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 686-87 (1996).
62
See, e.g., Levitan v. Fanfare Media Works, Inc., No. B156337, 2003 WL 21028339,
at *8 (Cal. Ct. App. May 8, 2003).
63
The Court has stated that “if [a] law arose to govern issues concerning the validity, revocability, and enforceability of contracts generally,” it is not preempted. Perry
v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987). And as I explain in Section IV.A, lower
courts routinely deny preemption challenges predicated on the allegedly more stringent application of general contract law doctrines to arbitration agreements. See infra
notes 312-15 and accompanying text. Only a handful of courts have found the FAA to
preempt certain applications of the unconscionability defense. See, e.g., Wince v. Easterbrooke Cellular Corp., 681 F. Supp. 2d 679, 685-86 (N.D. W. Va. 2010); Shubert v.
Wells Fargo Auto Fin., Inc., No. 08-3754, 2008 WL 5451021, at *7 (D.N.J. Dec. 31,
2008); Weinstein v. AT&T Mobility Corp., No. 07-2880, 2008 WL 1914754, at *5 (E.D.
Pa. Apr. 30, 2008); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Coe, 313 F. Supp. 2d
603, 615 (S.D. W. Va. 2004); Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 393,
407-08 (Ct. App. 2003), rev’d, 113 P.3d 1100 (2005). After Homa v. American Express Co.,
558 F.3d 225 (3d Cir. 2009), the foregoing decisions from within the Third Circuit are
no longer good law.
There is some debate as to whether the Paradigm actually preempts (or would
preempt) the “hostile” application of general contract laws. The Court has suggested,
for instance, that lower courts may not “rely on the uniqueness of an agreement to arbitrate as a basis for a state-law holding that enforcement would be unconscionable.”
Perry, 482 U.S. at 492 n.9; see also Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 687 n.3 (emphasizing the principle from Perry). This statement, however, is dictum because the issue in Perry was
whether the FAA preempted a state statute, not the unconscionability defense. Perry,
482 U.S. at 489-91. The Court has also stated that judges may not “decide that a con-
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There has been some uncertainty as to how “general” a law must be
in order to escape preemption under this standard. Many commentators have taken the position that the state rule must apply to “all”
64
contracts. According to this view, only state contract law would appear
to avoid preemption. Others have wondered whether a law would be
considered general enough as long as it applied on its face to
65
arbitration agreements and at least one other type of agreement.
66
Although the Court may soon address this issue, the majority
view in the lower courts is that to avoid preemption, the state law must
67
be basic enough that it extends to literally “all contracts.” Thus, state
tract is fair enough to enforce all its basic terms (price, service, credit), but not fair
enough to enforce its arbitration clause.” Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson,
513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995). But this, too, was dictum because Allied-Bruce did not involve
a preemption challenge to a contract defense but rather to a statute that singled out
arbitration. Id. at 281-82. This leads me to conclude that, in its current form, the Paradigm does not clearly require the preemption of native contract law when the law is
applied in a manner that discriminates against arbitration.
The Court may change this landscape in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, which was
argued in November 2010. See Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849 (9th Cir.
2009), cert. granted sub nom. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 130 S. Ct. 3322 (2010)
(No. 09-0893).
64
See, e.g., Drahozal, supra note 41, at 408-09 (highlighting the problem of forumselection laws that neither single out arbitration nor apply generally to “all contracts”);
Hayford, supra note 17, at 78 (observing that the FAA preempts state laws “that do not
apply equally to all contracts”); Hayford & Palmiter, supra note 29, at 213-14 (observing
that the FAA does not preempt “state law standards applied in determining the validity
of all contracts”); Margaret L. Moses, Privatized “Justice,” 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 535, 541
(2005) (“[T]he Court’s position is that for grounds to be available to render an arbitration provision unenforceable, such grounds must be . . . potentially applicable to all
contracts.”); Stephen J. Ware, Contractual Arbitration, Mandatory Arbitration, and State
Constitutional Jury-Trial Rights, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 39, 47 (2003) (rescinding the author’s
earlier claim that a law would not have to apply “literally, [to] all contracts” to be
deemed “general”). But see 1 IAN R. MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW
§ 10.7.2 (Supp. 1999) (defining “general contract law” as anything that is not state arbitration law); Schwartz, Power of Congress, supra note 16, at 570 n.114 (“Clearly, it is overselling the point to suggest that ‘any contract’ plainly means ‘all contracts.’”); Jean R.
Sternlight, The Rise and Spread of Mandatory Arbitration as a Substitute for the Jury Trial, 38
U.S.F. L. REV. 17, 36-37 (2003) (arguing that a law is “general” enough to be protected
from preemption even if it “do[es] not apply generally to all kinds of contracts in a
given state”).
65
See 1 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 64, § 10.7.2.
66
In Concepcion, the petitioner argued that California’s unconscionability test for
collective action waivers should be preempted because it does not literally apply to all
clauses, just clauses relating to dispute resolution. Brief for Petitioner at 3, 17, 31, 40,
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, No. 09-0893 (U.S. Aug. 2, 2010).
67
See, e.g., Ticknor v. Choice Hotels Int’l, Inc., 265 F.3d 931, 937 (9th Cir. 2001)
(holding state contract law defenses not preempted “as long as . . . [they] are generally
applied to all contracts”); Saturn Distrib. Corp. v. Williams, 905 F.2d 719, 725-26 (4th
Cir. 1990) (reasoning that a state law is preempted unless it “declare[s] all contracts of
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laws prohibiting the selection of an out-of-state dispute resolution forum in franchise or construction contracts routinely fail the “general”
test on the ground that they apply only to contracts within certain sectors (e.g., franchise, construction, etc.) and then only to contracts
68
containing forum-selection clauses. Therefore, I interpret the Paradigm as requiring that a state law is “generally applicable” only if it
69
applies in principle to all contracts.
At the other extreme from a general law is a law that applies solely
to arbitration agreements. Consider a Montana law that required all
arbitration clauses to be “‘typed in underlined capital letters on the
70
first page of the contract.’” In Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, the
71
Court held that this law impermissibly “singl[ed] out arbitration” by
placing special conditions on arbitration agreements that did not apply to all other contracts: “[G]enerally applicable contract defenses,
such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability, may be applied to invalidate arbitration agreements without contravening § 2. Courts may
not, however, invalidate arbitration agreements under state laws ap72
plicable only to arbitration provisions.” Enforcement-impeding laws
73
that “single out” arbitration, in other words, are always preempted.
adhesion to be presumptively unenforceable”); Sec. Indus. Ass’n v. Connolly, 883 F.2d
1114, 1121 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding that the FAA does not preempt state rules that apply to “all” contracts); Thibodeau v. Comcast Corp., 912 A.2d 874, 880 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2006) (“[T]he FAA does not preempt the application of state law that applies equally
to all contracts.”); cf. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443
(2006) (“Section 2 . . . places arbitration agreements on equal footing with all other
contracts . . . .” (emphasis added)).
For a more detailed discussion of the majority view in the lower courts, to the
effect that the FAA preempts a state law unless the state law literally applies to “all”
contracts, see Aragaki, supra note 27 (manuscript subsection II.B.1).
68
See, e.g., Bradley v. Harris Research, Inc., 275 F.3d 884, 890 (9th Cir. 2001); KKW
Enters., Inc. v. Gloria Jean’s Gourmet Coffees Franchising Corp., 184 F.3d 42, 52 (1st
Cir. 1999).
69
Elsewhere, I have explained why this requirement is ultimately incoherent. See
Aragaki, supra note 27 (manuscript Section II.B); see also Brief of Arbitration Professors
as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 25-29, AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,
No. 09-0893 (U.S. Oct. 6, 2010).
70
Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 683 (1996) (quoting MONT.
CODE. ANN. § 27-5-114(4) (1995)). The law was enforcement impeding insofar as it
denied enforcement to nonconforming arbitration clauses.
71
Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 687.
72
Id. (citations omitted). Lower courts appear to have entertained some version
of the “single out test” prior to Casarotto. See, e.g., Connolly, 883 F.2d at 1120 (“[A]ny
separate regulatory action or sanction singling out arbitration agreements from contracts generally would be preempted.”).
73
See Hayford & Palmiter, supra note 29, at 204 (arguing that the Paradigm “forbids any state law (statutory or judicial) that singles out arbitration for suspect treat-
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Unlike those falling in the “general” category, such laws are easy to
spot: they apply on their face to arbitration and only arbitration.
The following table summarizes the Paradigm as I have so far
described it:
Figure 1: Summary of the Paradigm

Enforcementimpeding state law
that . . .
Enforcement-neutral
state law that . . .

. . . singles out
arbitration

. . . is completely
general

Always preempted

Not preempted

Not preempted

Not preempted

One remarkable aspect of the Paradigm is its formalism: it does
not matter why a state statute singles out arbitration, just that it does
so. Likewise, it is irrelevant what consequences the state law portends
for a given arbitration agreement. The Paradigm sees no difference
between a law that denies legal effect to all predispute arbitration
agreements statewide and one that merely precludes arbitrators from
awarding certain types of remedies in a narrow class of disputes.
II. REINTERPRETING THE PARADIGM AS AN
ANTI-DISCRIMINATION PRINCIPLE
What makes the Paradigm tick? Why should the FAA preempt an
enforcement-impeding law that singles out arbitration but not one
that is completely general on its face? In this Part, I argue that the
Paradigm is animated by a principle of nondiscrimination—a principle
whose purpose is to dispel stubborn prejudices about arbitration’s inferiority as a method of resolving disputes. In Sections II.A through
II.C, I elaborate on the meaning of this principle by looking at three

ment”); Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration and Unconscionability After Doctor’s Associates, Inc.
v. Casarotto, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1001, 1012 (1996) (“Any law that singles out
arbitration agreements by making them less enforceable than other contracts is
preempted by the FAA.”).
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contexts in which it manifests itself most clearly: (1) the FAA’s
response to the historic common law “hostility” to arbitration, (2) the
Court’s more recent FAA jurisprudence outside the preemption area,
and (3) the Court’s current doctrinal test for FAA preemption. In
Section II.D, I offer some observations about how well the Paradigm
lives up to its anti-discrimination pedigree.
My thesis that the Paradigm expresses an anti-discrimination principle begs the question of what exactly I mean by “anti-discrimination,”
as the term itself has been interpreted in many different, sometimes
contradictory, ways. Some conceive of anti-discrimination as a principle
of “anti-differentiation”—one that merely seeks to eliminate distinctions
74
between people or things based on irrelevant differences. At the other extreme, progressive scholars have argued that the true task of antidiscrimination is to overhaul the structural dominance of certain
groups over others. On this “anti-subordination” view, even laws or
measures that inadvertently perpetuate historical patterns of power
75
and privilege constitute impermissible discrimination. Between the
two extremes lies what some have identified as an “anti-oppression”
theory, which registers the wrongfulness of discrimination in terms of
purposeful conduct motivated by improper considerations, such as pre76
judice toward traditionally oppressed groups.
Of the three models of anti-discrimination described above, the one
that comports best with the Paradigm is the anti-oppression view. This
claim may strike some readers as rather surprising. It is difficult, for instance, to appreciate how arbitration could possibly have endured the
type of oppression normally associated with minorities and women, and
thus why the Paradigm should be interpreted as anything more than an
anti-differentiation principle. To this I have three responses.
First, the central argument of this Article—that the Paradigm regards arbitration as having a kind of “suspect” status—only makes

74

See John Hasnas, Equal Opportunity, Affirmative Action, and the Anti-Discrimination
Principle: The Philosophical Basis for the Legal Prohibition of Discrimination, 71 FORDHAM L.
REV. 423, 431-33 (2002) (providing examples of the anti-differentiation principle).
75
See Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107,
157 (1976); see also Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2410,
2422-24 (1994).
76
Hasnas, supra note 74, at 434-36. I recognize that the anti-oppression view is generally considered to be a species of the anti-subordination view rather than as something
separate from it. See id. at 437. In treating the two as separate, I seek merely to distinguish
the anti-oppression view from other, more robust variants of the anti-subordination view.
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sense on the anti-oppression or anti-subordination view. The antidifferentiation theory can be ruled out on the further ground that situations in which state law favors arbitration agreements over other
78
agreements do not offend the Paradigm. Second, as between the antioppression and the anti-subordination theories, the former is more
consistent with the Paradigm’s emphasis on reversing unjustified “hostility” toward arbitration, which in turn suggests intentional—more so
than structural—discrimination. Moreover, as a policy matter, the
strong redistributive and remedial rationales typically associated with
the anti-subordination view are unpersuasive in the arbitration con79
text. Finally, keep in mind that I am not making an empirical claim
about the existence or nature of “oppression” against arbitration. Nor
am I claiming that the FAA was originally intended to be an anti80
oppression statute. Instead, I simply seek to decode and render explicit claims that the Court has made on the subject and to use them to
critique existing FAA preemption jurisprudence. Anti-discrimination
law and theory help my analysis because they provide sophisticated
analytical frameworks, not because they furnish governing law.
A. Unjustified Hostility Toward Arbitration: Origins to 1925
For at least two centuries prior to the advent of modern arbitration statutes in the United States, executory arbitration agreements
were unenforceable for all practical purposes. First, according to the
77

See Reginald C. Oh, A Critical Linguistic Analysis of Equal Protection Doctrine: Are
Whites a Suspect Class?, 13 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 583, 588 (2004) (describing
the “law of suspect classes” as being more consistent with the anti-subordination than
the anti-differentiation view); see also Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination:
The Reality of Supreme Court Rhetoric, 86 GEO. L.J. 279, 297, 305 (1997).
78
Section 2 of the FAA does not preempt state laws that privilege arbitration
agreements over other agreements. See Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland
Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 476 & n.5 (1989). Instead, it is only concerned
with what I have defined as enforcement-impeding laws—that is, laws that adversely
affect the enforceability of arbitration agreements. See supra Section I.A. Indeed, the
FAA as a whole favors arbitration agreements by providing an elaborate mechanism for
enforcing such agreements (but no other agreement). See Aragaki, supra note 27 (manuscript Section IV.B); infra notes 184-89 and accompanying text.
79
See infra notes 335-47 and accompanying text. As compared with the antisubordination view, what I am referring to as the anti-oppression theory represents a
weaker anti-discrimination regime, which in turn should make it more palatable to
those who are uncomfortable with the anti-discrimination analogy to begin with. I explain in greater detail why the anti-subordination view is inconsistent with the Paradigm in the companion piece to this Article. See Aragaki, supra note 27 (manuscript
Section III.A).
80
See supra text accompanying note 28.
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common law “revocability doctrine,” parties to such agreements were
entitled to revoke their promise to arbitrate at any time until the arbi81
trators issued their award. This legal loophole effectively made it impossible to order specific performance of an executory arbitration
agreement, for once so ordered, the breaching party could simply turn
82
Without the remedy of specific
around and revoke her promise.
performance, the nonbreaching party could obtain only money
83
84
damages for breach, which were considered nominal at best.
Second, there was no legal mechanism for pleading an executory
85
arbitration agreement as a complete bar to an action at law. Third,
courts would not even stay a legal action pending a determination of
86
arbitrability, thus giving plaintiffs intent on evading arbitration a
considerable tactical advantage. In this legal climate, arbitration
agreements were simply not “regarded in the same light as other
contractual obligations”—so much so that a party reneging on such a
promise “frequently [did] not [even] realize that he [wa]s violating
87
his plighted word.”
Early twentieth-century merchants who lobbied for the FAA’s
passage explained the common law’s unfavorable treatment of
arbitration agreements as the product of a long history of judicial
88
“hostility” toward arbitration.
The ostensible justification for this
hostility was that it was against public policy to “oust[]” the courts of
81

See S. REP. NO. 68-536, at 2 (1924); IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION
LAW 20 (1992). This so-called “revocability doctrine” originated at English common
law but became widely accepted by U.S. courts throughout the nineteenth century. See
Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Rustic Justice: Community and Coercion Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 77 N.C. L. REV. 931, 974-75 (1999).
82
See S. REP. NO. 68-536, at 2 (1924); see also Tobey v. Cnty. of Bristol, 23 F. Cas.
1313, 1320-21 (C.C. Mass. 1845) (No. 14,065) (Story, J.).
83
See Doleman & Sons v. Ossett Corp., [1912] 3 K.B. 257 at 269-71 (Eng.).
84
See 1 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 64, § 4.3.2.2 (“[D]amages were generally impossible to prove.”).
85
See U.S. Asphalt Ref. Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co., 222 F. 1006, 1010
(S.D.N.Y. 1915); WESLEY A. STURGES, A TREATISE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATIONS AND
AWARDS § 15 (1930).
86
See Hurst v. Litchfield, 39 N.Y. 377, 379 (1868); S. REP. NO. 68-536, at 2 (1924);
JULIUS HENRY COHEN, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE LAW 226-41 (1918).
87
Cohen & Dayton, supra note 17, at 270.
88
Although this hostility has often been described as directed at arbitration
agreements, it was first and foremost a hostility toward the arbitral process. See Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 982-83 (2d Cir. 1942) (criticizing judicial hostility toward the arbitration process); see also Southland Corp. v.
Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1984) (linking the courts’ refusals to enforce arbitration
agreements to the “old common-law hostility toward arbitration”); Aragaki, supra note
27 (manuscript Part IV).
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their jurisdiction to hear cases, even by agreement of the parties.
But it was difficult to square this so-called “ouster” rule with the fact
that judges were perfectly content to cede their jurisdiction in the face
of a valid settlement agreement, release, covenant not to sue, or
90
arbitral award. Each, no less than executory arbitration agreements,
invaded the courts’ prerogative to hear cases.
These unexplained inconsistencies fed the perception that the
law’s hostility was based on sheer anti-arbitration bias rather than on
legitimate considerations about jurisdiction or procedure. According
to Julius Henry Cohen, the chief architect of the FAA, this bias
originated in English judges, who were compensated based on the
number of cases they heard and had accordingly developed a “great
jealousy of arbitrations whereby Westminster Hall was robbed of [its]
91
cases.” This, in turn, led them to manufacture a “fear that arbitration
92
tribunals could not do justice between the parties.” Arbitrators thus
came to be portrayed as “caricatures of their judicial siblings—‘pie
93
splitters,’ who lacked requisite pedigree and cultivation.” Although
they could be entrusted with incidental matters, such as whether a
party’s obligations were adequately performed or when they came due,
89

See H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1-2 (1924); S. REP. NO. 68-536, at 2 (1924).
This point was perhaps most forcefully made in Kulukundis, 126 F.2d at 983-84,
an opinion that Judge Learned Hand joined. See also Arbitration of Interstate Commercial
Disputes: Joint Hearings Before the Subcomms. of the Comms. on the Judiciary on S. 1005 and
H.R. 646, 68th Cong. 14-15 (1924) [hereinafter 1924 Hearings] (statement of Julius
Henry Cohen); COHEN, supra note 86, at 12, 55, 160, 205, 278.
91
See COHEN, supra note 86, at 254 (citing Scott v. Avery, (1856) 10 Eng. Rep. 1121
(H.L.) 1126); see also Heinrich Kronstein, Business Arbitration—Instrument of Private Government, 54 YALE L.J. 36, 62-63 (1944) (claiming that the financial interests of judges
drove early English opposition to arbitration). But see Kulukundis, 126 F.2d at 983-84
nn.14-16 (collecting authorities on both sides of the debate).
92
S. REP. NO. 68-536, at 2-3 (1924); see also Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402, 406 (2d Cir. 1959) (observing that English judges were willing
to “resort[] to a great variety of devices . . . [to preserve] their monopoly of the
administration of justice”); U.S. Asphalt Ref. Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co., 222
F. 1006, 1007-08 (S.D.N.Y. 1915) (speculating that “the hostility of English-speaking
courts to arbitration contracts probably originated . . . ‘in the contests of the courts of
ancient times for extension of jurisdiction’” (citing Scott, 10 Eng. Rep. at 1138)); A.B.A.
Comm. on Commerce, Trade & Commercial Law, The United States Arbitration Law and
Its Application, 11 A.B.A. J. 153, 155 (1925).
93
Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arbitral Justice: The Demise of Due Process in American
Law, 70 TUL. L. REV. 1945, 1947 (1996); cf. Sales and Contracts to Sell in Interstate and Foreign Commerce, and Federal Commercial Arbitration: Hearing on S. 4213 and S. 4214 Before a
Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th Cong. 7 (1923) [hereinafter 1923 Hearings] (statement of Charles L. Bernheimer) (describing a case in which a shipper who
had held preconceived notions about arbitration changed his mind after familiarizing
himself with the process).
90
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they were considered incompetent to decide “question[s] of liability
94
on the whole contract.” Even commercial lawyers, having reason to
oppose more efficient litigation alternatives that would threaten their
fees, initially disparaged arbitration as a “‘crude and imperfect. . .
95
method of settling disputes.’”
Enacted in 1925, the FAA was intended to bring reason and
modernity to bear on what the business community increasingly
96
97
98
viewed as the law’s “unjust,” irrational, and “anachronis[tic]”
treatment of arbitration.
The new arbitration law sought to
99
“revers[e]” this discriminatory treatment by dissolving the arbitrary
common law doctrines that had stood in the way of enforcing
100
No longer would a disgruntled
executory arbitration agreements.
trading partner be entitled to “refuse to perform [a valid arbitration]
101
At long last,
contract when it bec[ame] disadvantageous to him.”
valid agreements to arbitrate would receive the law’s full backing, just
102
like valid agreements to do anything else.
Critics such as Katherine Van Wezel Stone have persuasively
argued that the law’s hostility toward arbitration during this period
may not have been uniformly unjustified—that it was informed at least
in part by valid concerns about the lack of procedural safeguards in
arbitration or about vulnerable parties being pressured to bargain

94

1924 Hearings, supra note 90, at 25 (statement of Alexander Rose); see also Tobey
v. Cnty. of Bristol, 23 F. Cas. 1313, 1321 (C.C. Mass. 1845) (No. 14,065) (Story, J.)
(“[I]t has often been said, that the judgment of arbitrators is but rusticum judicium.”).
95
Sabra A. Jones, Historical Development of Commercial Arbitration in the United States,
12 MINN. L. REV. 240, 256 (1928) (quoting 13 CENT. L.J. 101, 101 (1881)); see also Cohen & Dayton, supra note 17, at 281-83.
96
Berkovitz v. Arbib & Houlberg, Inc., 130 N.E. 288, 292 (N.Y. 1921) (Cardozo,
J.); see also Joseph Wheless, Arbitration as a Judicial Process of Law, 30 W. VA. L.Q. 209,
213 (1924).
97
See COHEN, supra note 86, at 47; Wesley A. Sturges & Irving Olds Murphy, Some
Confusing Matters Relating to Arbitration Under the United States Arbitration Act, 17 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 580, 597 (1952).
98
1924 Hearings, supra note 90, at 16 (statement of Julius Henry Cohen); H.R. REP.
NO. 68-96, at 1-2 (1924).
99
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510 (1974).
100
See Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 225-26 (1987); H.R.
REP. NO. 68-96, at 1-2 (1924) (recognizing that legislative action was required because
anti-arbitration bias was so “firmly embedded in the . . . common law”).
101
H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1 (1924).
102
See id.; see also Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404
n.12 (1967) (describing FAA’s purpose “to make arbitration agreements as enforceable
as other contracts, but not more so”).
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103

away their recourse to the courts.
Be that as it may, the important
point is that the FAA sought to rectify only the law’s unthinking,
reflexive hostility toward arbitration—a hostility that, for no apparent
reason, prevented parties who “[stood] upon an equal footing . . .
[from] intelligently and deliberately” choosing to arbitrate their
104
disputes. This is amply illustrated in congressional debates over the
FAA, during which concerns were raised about the FAA’s liberalization of arbitration clauses in contexts such as employment and
insurance, where contracts were typically presented on a take-it-or105
Supporters of the FAA were readily capable of distinleave-it basis.
guishing these legitimate concerns from the less discerning “jealousy”
106
Thus, W.H.H. Piatt, the chairman
of the early common law courts.
of the ABA committee that had proposed the FAA to Congress,
declared that he would “not favor any kind of legislation that would
permit the forcing [of] a man to sign” an arbitration clause and,
moreover, that the FAA was not intended to apply to employment and
107
insurance contracts. Congress accordingly amended Section 1 to exclude “contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any
108
other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.”
To be sure, it is unlikely that drafters of the FAA conceived of the
statute’s purpose in terms of remedying “discrimination” against arbitration. Nonetheless, the historical record is replete with antidiscrimination themes. In the years following the FAA’s passage, the
Court would eventually organize those themes into a much more coherent norm of anti-discrimination.

103

See, e.g., Van Wezel Stone, supra note 81, at 969-94.
COHEN, supra note 86, at 228 (quoting Del. & H. Canal Co. v. Pa. Coal Co., 50
N.Y. 250, 258 (1872)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Even Van Wezel Stone
would agree with this statement insofar as she argues that the FAA should not necessarily preempt state laws that fail to reflect this unjustified hostility toward arbitration. See
Van Wezel Stone, supra note 81, at 1024-30. And if Van Wezel Stone is correct that
arbitration was generally used at the turn of the century only between members of a
self-regulating body or between parties with relatively equal bargaining power, Congress could hardly have intended the FAA as an unqualified endorsement of all the
ways in which arbitration agreements are used today. See id. at 969-1014; accord Sternlight, supra note 18, at 647.
105
See 1923 Hearings, supra note 93, at 11 (statement of W.H.H. Piatt).
106
Park Constr. Co. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 32 Carver Cnty., 296 N.W. 475, 477
(Minn. 1941).
107
1923 Hearings, supra note 93, at 10 (statement of W.H.H. Piatt).
108
Id. at 14 (reprinting Letter from Herbert Hoover, Sec’y of Commerce, to Thomas Sterling, Senator ( Jan. 31, 1923)); see also id. at 9 (statement of W.H.H. Piatt).
104
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B. Hostility in the Form of Suspicious Generalizations About
Arbitration: 1925 to the Present
In his discussion of what makes discrimination “wrong,” Larry
Alexander draws a useful distinction between biases and general109
izations.
Alexander describes biases as categorical preferences that
110
They reflect a judgment that persons
apply regardless of context.
with a certain trait “are morally less worthy than others merely by virtue
111
of possessing that trait.”
For example, the antimiscegenation law
112
challenged in Loving v. Virginia reflected a bias because it prohibited
marriage between certain individuals solely because of their race; that
113
is, it targeted race “for its own sake.”
By contrast, generalizations, proxies, and stereotypes reflect
judgments that persons with a certain trait (the proxy trait) are likely
to possess a further trait (the material trait) that, in turn, is a perfectly
114
“proper bas[is] for attributing differential moral worth.”
For
example, the government’s World War II–era decision to relocate
Japanese Americans living on the West Coast is better described as a
generalization than a bias because it used race as a proxy for a further
trait (national loyalty), which in turn was a legitimate trait to consider
115
To be sure, the
in making decisions about national security.
generalization that most Japanese Americans would be disloyal to the
United States may itself mask a bias against Japanese Americans. But
because generalizations and proxy judgments are also frequently ac116
curate and possess a certain heuristic value, it is not always easy to
differentiate between problematic and unproblematic ones.

109

See Larry Alexander, What Makes Wrongful Discrimination Wrong? Biases, Preferences, Stereotypes, and Proxies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 158-76 (1992).
110
Id. at 158.
111
Id. at 161; cf. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985)
(“[L]aws grounded in [race, alienage, or national origin] considerations are deemed
to reflect prejudice and antipathy—a view that those in the burdened class are not as
worthy or deserving as others.”).
112
388 U.S. 1 (1967).
113
Mary Ann Case, “The Very Stereotype the Law Condemns”: Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law as a Quest for Perfect Proxies, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1447, 1454 (2000).
114
Alexander, supra note 109, at 161; see also Paul Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975
Term—Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 10 (1976).
115
See Case, supra note 113, at 1452-53.
116
See Alexander, supra note 109, at 167 (“We could not function [in society]
without proxies and the stereotypes on which they are based.”); see also Brest, supra
note 114, at 6 (“Regulations and decisions based on statistical generalizations are
commonplace in all developed societies and essential to their functioning.”).
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The prevailing account of anti-arbitration hostility during the preFAA years suggests a categorical bias rather than a proxy judgment
insofar as the ouster doctrine was directed at arbitration per se,
regardless of considerations such as the nature of the dispute to be
arbitrated or the existence of any power imbalance between the
parties. Scholars such as Ian Macneil have rightly questioned whether
this narrative of hostility has not been greatly exaggerated as a matter
117
of historical fact. Even if Macneil is correct, however, the narrative
remains consistent with the existence of subtler forms of hostility in
the guise of problematic generalizations and stereotypes about arbitration. For instead of dismissing arbitration wholesale, more
sophisticated opponents have typically claimed that certain process
dangers are inextricably associated with arbitration to argue that the
118
problem lies with those dangers rather than with arbitration itself.
The evolution of the Court’s nonarbitrability doctrine—which has to
do with whether claims under selected federal statutes are immune
from arbitration despite the existence of a valid agreement to
arbitrate—provides a case in point.
Beginning in the 1950s, plaintiffs seeking redress under federal
statutes such as the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act brought their claims in court despite having signed
119
valid predispute arbitration clauses covering those claims. The Court
initially permitted this practice. It considered certain issues such as securities fraud and employment discrimination simply “too important”
120
to be entrusted to arbitration. It observed that arbitration generally
121
And although arbitradoes not afford a robust factfinding process.
tors might be “competent to resolve many preliminary factual ques-

117

See MACNEIL, supra note 81, at 19-21; see also Atl. Fruit Co. v. Red Cross Line,
276 F. 319, 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1921); Michael H. LeRoy & Peter Feuille, Judicial Enforcement
of Predispute Arbitration Agreements: Back to the Future, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL.
249, 272-77 (2003).
118
See Carbonneau, supra note 93, at 1947-48 (arguing that, in the international
context, most civil law codes did not “directly repudiate arbitration” but rather
“quietly undermined” it).
119
The theory was that such plaintiffs were not simply seeking compensation for
private injury; instead, they were attempting to vindicate important public values safeguarded by the relevant statute. In some cases, moreover, these plaintiffs were proceeding in the capacity of a private attorney general. See 2 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note
31, § 16.1.2.
120
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 632
(1985) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 723 F.2d
155, 162 (1st Cir. 1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
121
See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 57-58 (1974).
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tions, such as whether the employee ‘punched in’ when he said he
122
123
did,” they were “wholly unqualified to decide legal issues” or issues
124
of “great public interest.” Moreover, any errors they made would be
virtually impervious to correction, as there is no meaningful appellate
125
review of arbitral awards.
This, in turn, would frustrate the proper
126
interpretation and development of federal statutory law.
It is difficult to quarrel with many of these generalizations. For
instance, it is typically (but not always) true that judicial review of arbi127
tral awards is extremely limited. Indeed, many often tout this aspect
128
of arbitration as one of its chief advantages over litigation. Similarly,
for a long time it was not unreasonable to surmise that most labor arbi129
trators did not possess legal training. From these widely held observations, it was not preposterous for the Court to conclude that arbitration

122

Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 743 (1981).
Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 407 (1967)
(Black, J., dissenting); see also Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 743-44.
124
Am. Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821, 827 (2d Cir.
1968).
125
See Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., Inc., 350 U.S. 198, 203 (1956); Wilko
v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436-47 (1953).
126
See Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 57; Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436-47.
127
See 9 U.S.C. §§ 9, 10, 11 (2006). But even this uncontroversial statement requires some qualification. First, until recently, several circuits had allowed parties to
include a provision for de novo judicial review of the arbitrators’ award. E.g., P.R. Tel.
Co. v. U.S. Phone Mfg. Corp., 427 F.3d 21, 30-31 (1st Cir. 2005). The Court put an
end to this practice—at least insofar as the FAA is concerned—in Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 588 (2008).
Second, some parties may be contracting for second-tier review in the form of
appellate arbitration. Arbitration providers have drafted sample appellate arbitration provisions and rules of appellate arbitration, suggesting that the practice is not
altogether uncommon. See, e.g., AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, DRAFTING DISPUTE RESOLUTION CLAUSES: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 37 (2007), available at http://www.adr.org/
si.asp?id=4125; JAMS FOUND., OPTIONAL ARBITRATION APPEAL PROCEDURE 2-5 (2003),
available at http://www.jamsadr.com/files/Uploads/Documents/JAMS-Rules/JAMS_
Optional_Appeal_Procedures-2003.pdf.
128
A defining credo of the modern arbitration movement was that arbitrators’ errors of law should not be reviewed by a court, lest arbitration remain a mere prelude to
judicial proceedings. See MACNEIL, supra note 81, at 15-16.
129
See Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 57 n.18 (referring to a survey finding that “a substantial portion of labor arbitrators” had no law degree). Richard Shell suggests that
there might have been “marginally more lawyers acting as arbitrators in commercial . . . arbitration[s].” G. Richard Shell, ERISA and Other Federal Employment Statutes:
When Is Commercial Arbitration an “Adequate Substitute” for the Courts?, 68 TEX. L. REV. 509,
531 n.153 (1990); see also id. at 520 n.58 (collecting statistics on the percentage of labor
arbitrators who possess law degrees).
123
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130

was generally not an “adequate substitute for a judicial proceeding,”
at least with regard to a special class of federal statutory claims.
Nonetheless, the outcome of these early nonarbitrability cases was
difficult to reconcile with the undeniable fact that courts routinely enforced both (1) postdispute agreements to arbitrate such claims and
(2) all such agreements where both parties were members of the sec131
urities industry. If the arbitration process lacked the necessary machinery to protect public values enshrined in federal statutes or to ensure
the proper evolution of legal doctrine, this should be the case regardless of whether the parties struck the agreement after the dispute arose
or whether the parties were members of the same regulated prof132
ession—that is, regardless of the nature of the agreement to arbitrate.
In hindsight, this unexplained inconsistency rendered the early
nonarbitrability cases suspect. The Court came to fear that some of
the generalizations on which it had relied were in fact “pervaded
133
by . . . the old judicial hostility to arbitration.”
Accordingly, the
Court began to demand empirical evidence before concluding that a
chosen arbitration procedure was incapable of vindicating important
federal rights. Thus, in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc., the Court refused to accept the bare assertion that the “potential
complexity” of antitrust claims made them inappropriate for arbitra-

130

Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 222-23 (1985).
See 2 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 31, § 16.2.1 (noting that the nonarbitrability
defense did not apply to the arbitration of existing, as opposed to future, disputes); see
also Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 233 (1987); C. Edward
Fletcher, III, Privatizing Securities Disputes Through the Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements, 71 MINN. L. REV. 393, 420-27 (1987).
132
The agreement may certainly be relevant to other concerns, such as whether
the parties had (or should have) voluntarily and knowingly chosen arbitration. But
that is a separate matter. As Ian Macneil has argued in the antitrust context, the “essence of the [nonarbitrability doctrine] . . . is the appropriateness of arbitration to decide matters of public importance, not a policy against coerced arbitration agreements.” 2 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 31, § 16.6.3; see also McMahon, 482 U.S. at 228-31;
Robert B. von Mehren, From Vynior’s Case to Mitsubishi: The Future of Arbitration and
Public Law, 12 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 583, 618 (1986). But see Sternlight, supra note 18, at
647-48 (arguing that the outcome of the earliest nonarbitrability cases was primarily
driven by a concern for unwary consumers who may not have voluntarily or
intelligently consented to arbitration).
133
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 480 (1989)
(quoting Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Armtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 985 (2d
Cir. 1942)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129
S. Ct. 1456, 1470 (2009).
131
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134

tion.
To the contrary, it observed that arbitrators may be selected
based on their subject-matter expertise and, if not, that experts may
135
be appointed to assist them. In Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,
the Court dispensed with mere “speculat[ion] that arbitration panels
136
will be biased.”
And in Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon,
the Court condemned the law’s “general suspicion of the desirability
of arbitration,” finding no reason “to assume at the outset that
137
arbitrators will not follow the law.”
By interrogating otherwise reasonable generalizations about
arbitration, the Court unveiled the FAA’s anti-discrimination bona
fides. As Paul Brest has explained in the context of race:
The antidiscrimination principle fills a special need because—as even a
glance at history indicates—race-dependent decisions that are rational and
purport to be based solely on legitimate considerations are likely in fact to
rest on assumptions of the differential worth of racial groups or on the
138
related phenomenon of racially selective sympathy and indifference.

Rationality presents a low bar. The government’s generalizations
about Japanese American loyalties during World War II, for instance,
139
We scrutinize such race-based
were not necessarily irrational.
proxies more carefully, however, because we have reason to suspect that
they might mask “displaced biases” about the inferiority of one group to
140
another, or because they might tacitly perpetuate existing stereotypes

134

473 U.S. 614, 632-34 (1985) (emphasis added); see also McMahon, 482 U.S. at
232 (observing that arbitral tribunals are “readily capable of handling the factual and
legal complexities of antitrust claims”).
135
Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 633.
136
500 U.S. 20, 30 (1991).
137
482 U.S. 220, 232 (1987) (emphasis added).
138
Brest, supra note 114, at 7.
139
Id. at 6-7; see also 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 518, at 966 (3d ed. 2000); Sanford Levinson, Response, The Deepening Crisis of American
Constitutionalism, 40 GA. L. REV. 889, 911 (2006); cf. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST 31 (1980) (noting that apartheid could be considered “a rational, if misguided, means of avoiding racial strife” (emphasis omitted)).
140
See Alexander, supra note 109, at 169-70; Michael J. Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1023, 1052 (1979) (“[T]here
is the difficulty of determining whether a particular gender-dependent law is predicated on a factual generalization or, instead, on the illicit view of women as morally
subordinate and inferior.”).
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141

or inequalities between groups. That extra scrutiny is a hallmark of
142
the (anti-oppression-based) anti-discrimination principle.
The Court’s later nonarbitrability cases evince this same antidiscrimination impulse by holding generalizations about arbitration to
the fire. Those cases stand for the proposition that courts may not
143
“assum[e] the [arbitral] forum inadequate or its selection unfair.”
Judges must not issue sweeping pronouncements about the “essential
144
characteristics” of arbitration that purportedly make it an “inferior
145
system of justice.” And they may no longer refuse to enforce otherwise valid predispute arbitration agreements based on “outmoded presumption[s]” that are “far out of step” with the FAA’s more forward146
looking view of arbitration. Instead, they must examine specific features of the arbitral process contemplated by the parties to determine
147
whether they are sufficient to protect the statutory rights at issue.
To be clear, there were (and continue to be) valid, nondiscriminatory reasons for treating arbitration differently from courtroom adjudication. The trouble with the early nonarbitrability cases was never the
simple fact that the Court withheld certain federal statutory claims from
arbitration, for courts may still do so if a signatory to an arbitration
agreement can prove she will be unable “effectively [to] vindicate [her]
148
statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum” —in other words, if she
can prove that there are justifiable grounds for discriminating against
arbitration. Instead, the trouble was that the Court did so too dismis-

141

See Nev. Dept. of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 736 (2003); J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 139-40 (1994).
142
It is, of course, also a hallmark of the anti-subordination view more generally.
See supra note 76.
143
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 633
(1985).
144
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 259 (1987) (Blackmun,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
145
Stroh Container Co. v. Delphi Indus., Inc., 783 F.2d 743, 751 n.12 (8th Cir.
1986); see also Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 57 (1974) (calling the
arbitration process “inferior” to the judicial process).
146
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 481 (1989).
Compare these statements with the Court’s declaration just four years earlier that
gender-based classifications trigger heightened scrutiny because they “very likely reflect
outmoded notions of the relative capabilities of men and women.” City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 441 (1985).
147
See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 30-32 (1991).
148
Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 637; accord Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531
U.S. 79, 90-91 (2000); McMahon, 482 U.S. at 239-42.
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sively, based on a “general suspicion of the desirability of arbitration
149
and the competence of arbitral tribunals.”
To the extent the Court and others maintain that arbitration
150
continues to suffer unjustified discrimination, the discrimination
likely takes the form of these seemingly innocuous generalizations
rather than wholesale anti-arbitration bias—what Peter B. Rutledge
characterizes as “irresistible melodies tempting the listener to oppose
151
They are irresistible because, as critics of arbitration
arbitration.”
point out, they are frequently perfectly reasonable.
Consider the following “finding” of the Arbitration Fairness Act
currently pending before Congress: “Many corporations add to their
arbitration clauses unfair provisions that deliberately tilt the systems
against individuals, including provisions that strip individuals of
substantive statutory rights, ban class actions, and force people to
152
arbitrate their claims hundreds of miles from their homes.”
Depending on how one understands “many,” existing empirical
research is quite consistent with—and certainly does not contradict—
this claim. For example, in their study of fifty-two arbitration clauses
in consumer contracts, Linda Demaine and Deborah Hensler found
that 30.8% contained class action bans and 7.7% contained explicit
153
Similarly, the Searle Civil Justice Institute
limitations on damages.
recently found that 24.3% of arbitration clauses surveyed contained a
154
limitation on punitive damages, while 36.5% of arbitration clauses

149

McMahon, 482 U.S. at 231.
See Carbonneau, supra note 10, at 233, 253, 261, 262 (contending that arbitration continues to be the object of “demonization” and “hatred,” based either on sheer
ignorance of the arbitral process or a chauvinistic view of litigation as the “one true
religion”); infra Section IV.A.
151
Peter B. Rutledge, Who Can Be Against Fairness? The Case Against the Arbitration
Fairness Act, 9 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 267, 267 (2008).
152
Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, S. 931, 111th Cong. § 2(7) (2009);
see also Kenneth F. Dunham, Binding Arbitration and Specific Performance Under the FAA:
Will This Marriage of Convenience Survive?, 3 J. AM. ARB. 187, 238 (2004); cf. Jean R.
Sternlight, Fixing the Mandatory Arbitration Problem: We Need the Arbitration Fairness Act of
2009, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Fall 2009, at 5, 5.
153
Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, “Volunteering” to Arbitrate Through Predispute Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer’s Experience, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Winter–Spring 2004, at 55, 65, 71.
154
SEARLE CIVIL JUSTICE INST., CONSUMER ARBITRATION BEFORE THE AMERICAN
ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION 85 (2009) (on file with author). According to this report,
the incidence of class arbitration waiver provisions appears to differ from industry to
industry. For example, 100% of the cellular telephone contracts that the report
surveyed, but 0% of the insurance or real estate contracts, contained class action bans.
Id. at 103.
150
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155

from another sample contained class arbitration waivers.
True,
these percentages are no ringing endorsement for the charge of
156
But the use of class action bans and damage
widespread abuse.
waivers does not need to reach pandemic levels before the state is
justified in taking action against them.
Consider also the widely expressed view that corporate repeat
players “will likely select arbitrators who are at least unconsciously bi157
ased toward [them]” and that “[a]lthough such an individual may
well do her best to decide the case fairly, she will probably be able to
see the company’s position more easily than the little guy’s posi158
Because arbitration is a market-based dispute resolution metion.”
chanism, it is at the very least plausible that arbitrators are prone to be
159
Again, there is very little
biased in favor of “repeat player” clients.
160
conclusive evidence that arbitrators actually are biased. But it is not
unreasonable for a state legislature to rely on even “weak” and
“dubious” generalizations about arbitration when passing legislation
or crafting legal rules, any more than it is for an airline to refuse to
employ overweight persons based on the real but statistically unsup161
portable fear that they will suffer a heart attack on the job.
What makes these generalizations problematic to the Court and
others is not so much that they are irrational or unsupported by empirical data (they are not). Rather, the problem is that they are suspect
in light of the perceived historic “hostility” against arbitration. These
generalizations all share what Thomas Carbonneau has described as
the “familiar ring [of] . . . distrust” toward arbitration that the FAA

155

Id.
See Peter B. Rutledge, Common Ground in the Arbitration Debate, 1 Y.B. ARB. &
MEDIATION 1, 1-6 (2009); cf. Rutledge, supra note 151, at 268 (acknowledging that the
U.S. arbitration system is not “flawless, but it has largely worked well”).
157
Sternlight, supra note 18, at 684.
158
Id.
159
O’DONNELL, supra note 4, at 2. The Public Citizen report notes that arbitrators
have “a strong financial incentive to rule in favor of the companies that file cases
against consumers because they can make hundreds of thousands of dollars a year
conducting arbitrations.” Id. Rutledge observes that extant empirical research has
established a repeat player phenomenon and that the existence of this phenomenon—
but not its cause—serves as “common ground” between arbitration’s supporters and
detractors. Rutledge, supra note 156, at 4 tbl.2.
160
See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L.
REV. 1631, 1658 (2005) (conceding the difficulties in gathering empirical evidence
about arbitration).
161
Brest, supra note 114, at 6-7.
156

ARAGAKI REVISED FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

4/13/2011 1:27 PM

Arbitration’s Suspect Status

2011]

1263

162

seeks to reverse. In form, they are not unlike stereotyped judgments
that frequently lead to litigation in the employment context: “older
163
employees have problems adapting to changes”; “women . . . are too
164
165
‘emotional’”; Asian Americans are “unassertive.” In both contexts,
existing law demands particularized facts in place of generalizations
based on anecdotal evidence. This is the way in which the Court
regards any classification that disadvantages arbitration (like those
that disadvantage women or racial minorities) to be suspect. It is also
the sense in which I argue that the Court endows arbitration with a
kind of “suspect” status.
Critics of the Paradigm, such as Jean Sternlight, contend that the
Court’s demands for particularized facts are little more than a
“rhetorical game” that quietly shifts the burden to them to come up
with all the empirical evidence to demonstrate that arbitration is
166
What Sternlight perceives
inadequate for certain types of disputes.
as a mere ploy, however, is actually the Paradigm’s anti-discrimination
principle at work. The lesson of the Court’s later nonarbitrability
cases is that imperfect generalizations, which would be sufficient to
justify legislative intervention in other areas, are potentially
problematic in the arbitration context because they are likely to
disguise improper motives or perhaps reinforce the widely held
167
For this
perception of arbitration as “second-class adjudication.”
reason, the Court forces us to presume that arbitration and
courtroom adjudication are equal and requires those who insist
otherwise to defend their chain of reasoning in the clear light of day.
C. The Anti-discrimination Logic of the Single-Out/General Test
In the age of “mandatory” binding arbitration, the claim that arbitration continues to suffer something like discrimination is scarcely
believable—perhaps even perverse. This perception has understand-

162

THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF
ARBITRATION 230 (2d ed. 2000).
163
Beshears v. Asbill, 930 F.2d 1348, 1354 (8th Cir. 1991).
164
Lindahl v. Air Fr., 930 F.2d 1434, 1439 (9th Cir. 1991).
165
Chin v. Runnels, 343 F. Supp. 2d 891, 907 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
166
Sternlight, supra note 152, at 5.
167
Carbajal v. H&R Block Tax Servs., Inc., 372 F.3d 903, 906 (7th Cir. 2004) (Easterbrook, J.); cf. Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Employment Rights: The Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1017, 1046 (1996)
(noting the “significant and growing sentiment” that “arbitration relegates workers to
second-class justice”).
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ably led many skeptics to reject an anti-discrimination interpretation
168
of the Paradigm. In sharp contrast, I argue that we should take that
interpretation quite seriously—not because it best reflects empirical
truths or sound policy judgments in the arbitration area, but because
it best captures the rhetoric that courts invoke to justify what amounts
to “overrid[ing] the will of [a] democratically elected state legisla169
ture.” Understanding the anti-discrimination logic behind that rhetoric will help us to better critique the Paradigm and the extraordinary displacement of state law that it makes possible.
Take the Paradigm’s doctrinal test for preemption. The “singleout/general” test is a proxy for determining whether a state law
impermissibly discriminates against arbitration agreements. Just as
equal protection law presumes that laws singling out a protected class
do so based on improper motives (thus triggering heightened scrutiny),
the Paradigm perceives any law that targets arbitration on its face as
decidedly anti-arbitration: redolent of the “old common-law hos170
tility.” The association between singling out arbitration and invidious
treatment is so powerful that the Paradigm—unlike anti-discrimination
law—can scarcely imagine a law that both singles out arbitration and
expresses none of the trademark hostility toward it. Thus, when securities investors argued that a state regulation was not “inhospitable” or
“unfriendl[y]” to arbitration (and therefore not preempted) simply because it imposed special requirements solely on arbitration agreements,
171
On the
the First Circuit rejected the argument as sheer “casuistry.”
court’s view, any law that singles out arbitration “revivif[ies] the ancient
172
jurisdictional antagonism toward arbitration” by definition.
Similarly, drawing on the plain text of FAA section 2, the Court
has held that when states invalidate arbitration clauses “upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any con-

168

See, e.g., Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The Unconscionability Game: Strategic Judging
and the Evolution of Federal Arbitration Law, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1420, 1454-55 (2008); Michael Schneidereit, A Cold Night: Unconscionability as a Defense to Mandatory Arbitration
Clauses in Employment Agreements, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 987, 999 (2004).
169
Schwartz, State Judges, supra note 16, at 141.
170
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 14 (1984); see also Stirlen v. Supercuts,
Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138, 153 (Ct. App. 1997) (“State laws held preempted by the
FAA . . . reflect the traditional antiarbitration bias.”); Margaret M. Harding, The Clash
Between Federal and State Arbitration Law and the Appropriateness of Arbitration as a Dispute
Resolution Process, 77 NEB. L. REV. 397, 474 (1998) (“The FAA does not permit unequal
treatment; it does not permit the states to single out arbitration agreements . . . .”).
171
Sec. Indus. Ass’n v. Connolly, 883 F.2d 1114, 1117, 1120, 1124 (1st Cir. 1989).
172
Id. at 1120.
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174

tract,” they do not violate the FAA’s anti-discrimination mandate.
As Macneil put it, “the concept of general contract law is intended to
prevent states from treating agreements to arbitrate differently from
175
other contracts.” The Paradigm sees no need for preemption in this
case because “arbitration agreements are neither favored nor disfavored, but simply placed upon an equal footing with other
176
Here the Paradigm suffers from the opposite problem:
contracts.”
it has trouble imagining how a law that applies across the board to all
contracts could possibly be described as anti-arbitration.
Several courts and commentators are keenly attuned to the way in
which the Paradigm functions as an anti-discrimination principle,
even though they have stopped short of exploring the nature of that
principle in any depth. The California Supreme Court, for example,
has on several occasions described the FAA as preempting state laws
177
that “discriminate against arbitration clauses.”
Other courts have
likewise held state law preempted because it “discriminat[ed]” against
178
And more than one commentator has, in passing,
arbitration.
179
characterized the FAA as an “anti-discrimination statute” or as “a
180
sort of ‘equal protection’ clause for arbitration provisions.”
For
173

9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995); Prima
Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 n.12 (1967).
175
1 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 64, § 10.7.2 (emphasis omitted).
176
Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 698 (Cal. 2000).
177
E.g., Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1113 (Cal. 2005).
178
Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. C.A. Reaseguradora Nacional de Venez., 991 F.2d
42, 46 (2d Cir. 1993); see also Allen v. World Inspection Network Int’l, Inc., 911 A.2d
484, 493 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006); cf. Banc One Acceptance Corp. v. Hill, 367
F.3d 426, 432 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding state law not preempted because it failed to
“discriminate[] against arbitration”); Wells v. Chevy Chase Bank, F.S.B., 768 A.2d 620,
629 (Md. 2001) (same).
179
Ratner & Turner, supra note 25, at 797-98; see also Harding, supra note 170, at 457
(suggesting that the FAA preempts state laws that “discriminate against arbitration”).
180
Ling, supra note 26, at 193; see also Stephen A. Broome, An Unconscionable Application of the Unconscionability Doctrine: How the California Courts Are Circumventing the Federal Arbitration Act, 3 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 39, 43 (2006); Michael G. McGuinness & Adam
J. Karr, California’s “Unique” Approach to Arbitration: Why This Road Less Traveled Will
Make All the Difference on the Issue of Preemption Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 2005 J.
DISP. RESOL. 61, 78 n.145; Henry Paul Monaghan, Supreme Court Review of State-Court
Determinations of State Law in Constitutional Cases, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1919, 1955 &
n.171 (2003); Jack Wilson, “No-Class-Action Arbitration Clauses,” State-Law Unconscionability, and the Federal Arbitration Act: A Case For Federal Judicial Restraint and Congressional
Action, 23 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 737, 793 (2004).
Recently, both parties in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion argued to the Court that
the so-called “savings clause” in section 2 is best understood as an anti-discrimination
principle, and thus that the FAA should preempt state laws when they discriminate
174
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example, Alan Rau has argued that the FAA prohibits states from
“discriminat[ing] against [arbitration agreements] by treating them
181
more harshly than other contractual terms.” To Ian Macneil, “state
law that limits federal arbitration law in a discriminatory manner . . . is
182
plainly and simply preempted.”
Similarly, Jeffrey Stempel reasons
that higher standards of consent for arbitration agreements would be
183
preempted because they “discriminat[e] against arbitration.”
Here one could argue that, far from an anti-discrimination policy,
184
the Paradigm represents “a national policy favoring arbitration.”
There are two ways to understand this objection. The first is that the
Paradigm is better described as a norm of favoritism than one of antidiscrimination. The problem with this line of argument is that favoritism and anti-discrimination are not necessarily inconsistent with each
other. From the anti-oppression perspective, for instance, granting
preferences to historically oppressed groups can play an important
185
Similarly, to the extent the
role in furthering nondiscrimination.
Paradigm favors arbitration, it does so only in the service of reversing
186
It does not
the anti-arbitration hostility that the Court so fears.

against arbitration. See Brief for Petitioner at 28, No. 09-0893 (U.S. Aug. 2, 2010) (referring to the “fundamental nondiscrimination principle” in section 2); Brief for Respondents at 9-10, No. 09-0893 (U.S. Sept. 29, 2010) (arguing that “Section 2 establishes a rule of nondiscrimination toward arbitration”).
181
Alan Scott Rau, Does State Arbitration Law Matter at All? Part I: Federal Preemption,
ADR CURRENTS, June 1998, at 19, 19 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Bruhl,
supra note 168, at 1451, 1454-55 (describing as a principle of nondiscrimination the
FAA’s requirement that state courts apply the unconscionability doctrine in a way that
does not single out arbitration agreements); Burton, supra note 30, at 483 (same);
Harding, supra note 170, at 457 (criticizing the Court for preempting state contract
rules “even though those rules did not discriminate against arbitration”).
182
2 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 31, § 16.6.2.1.
183
Jeffrey W. Stempel, Arbitration, Unconscionability, and Equilibrium: The Return of
Unconscionability Analysis as a Counterweight to Arbitration Formalism, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON
DISP. RESOL. 757, 799 (2004).
184
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984) (emphasis added). Kenneth
Dunham, for instance, argues that in cases preceding Southland, the Court set the stage
for giving elevated status to arbitration agreements. Dunham, supra note 152, at 210;
see also Sternlight, supra note 18, at 661-62.
185
See Brest, supra note 114, at 16-19.
186
See Granite Rock Co. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 130 S. Ct. 2847, 2859 (2010)
(explaining the federal policy favoring arbitration as “merely an acknowledgment of
the FAA’s commitment to ‘overrule the judiciary’s longstanding refusal to enforce
agreements to arbitrate and to place such agreements upon the same footing as other
contracts’” (quoting Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ.,
489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989)).
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force arbitration on unwilling parties, nor does it prioritize arbitration
187
over other forms of dispute resolution.
The second interpretation of the objection is that even if the Paradigm expresses a norm of nondiscrimination, in practice courts flout
that norm by reaching consistently pro-arbitration outcomes. But a
disjunct between fact and norm does not necessitate the conclusion
188
that the norm itself is flawed.
In fact, it is equally compatible with
the anti-discrimination approach I develop, which sees in this disjunct
an even greater reason to enforce the norm rather than retreat from it.
D. Rethinking the Paradigm
From an anti-discrimination perspective, it is a mistake to think that
all enforcement-impeding laws that single out arbitration impermissibly
discriminate and that all generally applicable enforcement-impeding
laws do not. Enforcement-impeding laws are not anti-arbitration
simply because they target arbitration clauses, but rather because they
189
do so out of unjustified hostility toward arbitration.
On the other
hand, a law cannot be cleared from the taint of discrimination simply
because it is general in form: hostility can be expressed in subtle ways,
not just through facial classifications. An anti-discrimination model of
FAA preemption would incorporate these insights, as represented in
Figure 2 below.

187

See Volt, 489 U.S. at 476 (holding that parties are free to place limits on their
arbitration process). In absolute terms, therefore, “[t]here is no federal policy favoring arbitration.” Id.; see also Ware, supra note 17, at 538 (describing the presumption in
favor of arbitration as merely a “tie-breaker” for resolving doubts about the scope of an
existing arbitration agreement).
188
The Paradigm’s most vocal critics typically draw this very conclusion, which
leads many of them to seek solutions in Congress rather than in the Court’s own jurisprudence. See infra notes 214-17 and accompanying text.
189
See, e.g., Jevne v. Superior Court, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 542, 552 (Ct. App. 2003) (“[S]tate
laws that are not anti-arbitration or antagonistic to the process are not automatically
preempted by the FAA even though the state law relates only to arbitration agreements.”).

ARAGAKI REVISED FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

4/13/2011 1:27 PM

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

1268

[Vol. 159: 1233

Figure 2: An Anti-discrimination-Based
Model of FAA Preemption

Enforcementimpeding state law
that . . .

Enforcement-neutral
state law that . . .

. . . singles out
arbitration

. . . is completely
general

Should generally be
preempted unless
discrimination
is justified

Should generally not
be preempted unless
discrimination in
application

Not preempted

Not preempted

The touchstone for obstacle-preemption analysis is whether a
state law or rule “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
190
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” I argue
that the FAA’s purpose must be understood as displacing only state
laws that unjustifiably discriminate against arbitration agreements—
that is, laws motivated by arbitrary hostility, mistrust, or suspicious
191
Only state laws that offend
generalizations about arbitration itself.
this anti-discrimination principle should be displaced by the
192
Supremacy Clause.
In Parts III and IV, I will attempt to defend an alternative preemption model based on Figure 2. I suggest that such a model would be
useful for both critics and proponents of arbitration alike. By proposing ways to scale back the Paradigm’s preemptive reach, I hope to address the concerns of those who claim that arbitration agreements are
fundamentally unjust in certain contexts. On the other hand, by offering ways of adapting the Paradigm to capture discrimination in the
application of general contract defenses, I hope to allay the concerns
of those who fear that a new anti-arbitration crusade is afoot.
190

Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861, 873 (2000) (quoting Hines
v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
191
See Hayford & Palmiter, supra note 29, at 195 (“At the core, the Court’s
preemption analysis merely aims at cleaning away any lingering anti-arbitration sentiment found in state statutes and case law.”).
192
To reiterate, this Article is limited to FAA preemption based on section 2. See
supra note 42 and accompanying text.
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In advancing these arguments, I shall draw upon the conceptual
resources of other anti-discrimination regimes such as the Equal
Protection Clause, Title VII, and the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade. To be sure, there are important differences among these
193
regimes. In the discussion that follows, I intentionally elide some of
these key differences in order to focus on the basic anti-discrimination
principles that the regimes all share.
Some will undoubtedly question whether the Court’s Dormant
Commerce Clause jurisprudence would not provide a better point of
comparison. After all, arbitration agreements are not persons, and
the claims that inhere in them seem more economic than dignitary in
nature. The objection would have more force if my aim were to
articulate a substantive law of anti-discrimination for the right to
enforce arbitration agreements. But my purpose is instead to use
basic anti-discrimination concepts—concepts common to most
established anti-discrimination regimes—to help refine existing FAA
preemption analysis. In this Part, I have attempted to show that this
analysis presupposes a theory of arbitration’s “suspect” status. The
Court’s equal protection (and, to a lesser extent, Civil Rights Acts)
jurisprudence is simply the most sophisticated model for
understanding, indentifying, and addressing the problem of suspect,
status-based discrimination.
III. OVERPREEMPTION AND THE PROBLEM OF JUSTIFIED DISCRIMINATION
In this Part, I focus exclusively on enforcement-impeding laws that
single out arbitration. It is fair to assume that any law targeting arbi194
My
tration (and only arbitration) on its face does so intentionally.
aim here is to challenge the Paradigm’s assumption that if a state law
purposefully disfavors arbitration, then the law is necessarily problematic from an anti-discrimination perspective. This faulty assumption,
I argue, has led to the overpreemption of state law.

193

Others have argued that some of these differences are “artificial” and “can obscure
our ability to understand the broader issues governing the Court’s limited antidiscrimination vision.” Selmi, supra note 77, at 285; see also Hasnas, supra note 74, at 485 n.231.
194
Similarly, in the equal protection context, the Court has held that no showing
of discriminatory intent is necessary when the law is “overtly discriminatory” on its face.
Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 n.10 (1985).
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A. The Tension Between Anti-discrimination and Government Regulation
Like any principle that seeks to address the problem of discrimination, the Paradigm confronts a tension: regulation for the public
good is an unavoidable fact of modern societies, yet any attempt to le195
gislate in a given area will single out some groups and not others. As
the Court once famously put it, “[c]lassification is the essence of all
196
legislation . . . .” A child-labor law, for example, singles out employers of children below a certain age rather than all employers generally. Likewise, a statutory speed limit treats speeding vehicles differently
from slower ones.
In the arbitration area, the Paradigm resolves this tension in favor
of a principle of strict equality: only laws that apply across the board to
197
“any contract” will survive preemptive scrutiny. The Paradigm thereby takes the anti-discrimination injunction quite literally, as a strong
anti-differentiation principle. It permits states to regulate arbitration
only so long as they do so in the image of Lady Justice—in a way that is
198
utterly blind to the very object of legislation. Not unlike the “sepa199
rate but equal” rationale of Plessy v. Ferguson, the Paradigm privileges
200
formal over substantive equality. As more than one frustrated state
judge has observed, this has enabled the Paradigm to maintain “an
201
intellectual detachment from reality.”
But in its zeal to place arbitration on an equal “footing” with all
other contracts, the Paradigm ignores the inequalities inherent in the
use of arbitration agreements by big business against the proverbial
“little guy”—victims of predatory lending, employment discrimination,
and the like. Many state laws that the FAA currently preempts are
195

See Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37
CALIF. L. REV. 341, 343 (1949); see also Peter Westen, The Meaning of Equality in Law,
Science, Math, and Morals: A Reply, 81 MICH. L. REV. 604, 620 (1983).
196
Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 967 (1982).
197
See supra notes 59-69 and accompanying text.
198
See Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987) (“A court may not, then, in assessing the rights of litigants to enforce an arbitration agreement, construe that agreement in a manner different from that in which it otherwise construes nonarbitration
agreements under state law.”); cf. McGuinness & Karr, supra note 180, at 84 (arguing that
in order to be consistent with the FAA, a court “may not even consider the fact that a
contract to arbitrate is at issue in assessing whether the agreement is unconscionable”).
199
163 U.S. 537 (1896).
200
See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 386 (3d ed. 2005)
(describing the Plessy decision as betraying a “studied ignorance (or disregard) of the
realities of life in the South”).
201
Lombardi I, 886 P.2d 931, 940 (Mont. 1994) (Trieweiler, J., specially concurring), vacated, 515 U.S. 1129 (1995).
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seeking to address precisely these concerns, not by banning
arbitration outright but by targeting discrete problem areas. For example, some states outlaw arbitration clauses only when imposed on especially vulnerable parties such as wage laborers and small business
202
owners. Others require arbitration clauses to be typed in bold or ca203
pitalized letters in order to promote knowing and voluntary assent.
Still others have attempted to police the arbitration process: for example, some states have required arbitration providers to disclose conflicts
204
The
of interest or otherwise to comply with state ethical standards.
Paradigm is fundamentally incapable of distinguishing between these
laws and cruder variants such as an Alabama law that imposed a state205
The Parawide restriction on all predispute arbitration agreements.
digm has no analytical apparatus with which to weigh the gravity and
sincerity of a state’s regulatory interest against the strength of its own
anti-discrimination mandate. And in applying the single-out/general
test, the Court has shown little inclination to think outside the zero-sum
box—to consider whether and how constraining arbitration might actually restore its legitimacy in the eyes of the public and thereby further,
206
rather than foil, any so-called “national policy favoring arbitration.”
Instead, the Paradigm effectuates what Justice Scalia has described
as “a permanent, unauthorized eviction of state-court power” to legis207
late in the arbitration area. States may not so much as “attempt[] to
208
This has
undercut the enforceability of arbitration agreements.”
understandably led consumer advocates, reformers, and other

202

See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1298.7 (West 2007) (voiding certain arbitration provisions in construction contracts); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-2(c)(8) (2007) (voiding arbitration clauses in residential real estate agreements unless all signatories initial
the clauses); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-114(2)(c) (2007) (voiding arbitration agreements in insurance and annuity contracts except between insurance companies); TEX.
CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 171.002(a)–(b) (West 2005) (voiding arbitration
clauses in contracts for the sale of goods worth less than $50,000 unless the parties
agree in writing and their attorneys sign the agreement).
203
E.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 7191 (West 1995); MO. ANN. STAT. § 435.460
(West 1992); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-2602.02 (2008).
204
E.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1281.85(a), 1281.92(b) (West 2007).
205
ALA. CODE § 8-1-41(3) (1993), preemption recognized by Allied-Bruce Terminix
Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 278-81 (1995).
206
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984).
207
Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 285 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
208
Southland, 465 U.S. at 16 (emphasis added); see also id. at 11 (“We see nothing
in the Act indicating that the broad principle of enforceability is subject to any additional limitations under state law.”).
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opponents of arbitration to abandon hope in the Paradigm. Rather
than ask whether there might be principled ways to limit or salvage
the Paradigm, they have largely looked to other strategies.
One such strategy has been to argue that the FAA should not
preempt any state law. For example, the weight of scholarly opinion is
that Congress originally intended the FAA as a set of procedural rules
to govern the enforcement of arbitration agreements in federal court,
not as an exercise of Congress’s substantive lawmaking power under
210
the Commerce Clause. This has led scholars such as David Schwartz
211
to contend that “FAA preemption is unconstitutional” and thus that
the Court should forthwith jettison the better part of its existing FAA
212
Not surprisingly, the Court has shown
preemption jurisprudence.
213
little receptivity to this suggestion.
Another strategy has been to attempt to shrink the FAA’s
preemptive shadow—either through congressional amendment or
through parallel federal legislation that would supersede the FAA in
certain industry-specific contexts. In 2009 alone, numerous bills to
214
this effect were introduced and reintroduced in Congress.
The
most ambitious and recent of these was the highly controversial
209

See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996
SUP. CT. REV. 331, 402 (“If we are to have sound arbitration law, there is no place to
look for it except in the halls of Congress.”).
210
See, e.g., MACNEIL, supra note 81, at 87-147; David S. Schwartz, Correcting Federalism Mistakes in Statutory Interpretation: The Supreme Court and the Federal Arbitration Act,
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter–Spring 2004, at 5, 18. But see Drahozal, supra note
17, at 105 (noting that “there are ‘strong indications’ in the legislative history that the
drafters of the FAA intended it to apply in state court”).
211
Schwartz, Power of Congress, supra note 16, at 542.
212
See Schwartz, supra note 210, at 7, 54.
213
In amicus briefs to the Court, Schwartz and others have advocated overruling
the seminal Southland decision, which paved the way for FAA preemption. See AlliedBruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 272 (1995) (describing the amicus
brief filed by some twenty state attorneys general); Brief for Law Professors as Amici
Curiae in Support of Respondents at 1, Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444
(2003) (No. 02-6034). The Court rejected this argument in Allied-Bruce but did not
reach the issue in Bazzle.
214
See, e.g., Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2010, H.R. 3326, 111th
Cong. § 8116 (2009) (enacted); Predatory Mortgage Lending Practices Reduction Act,
H.R. 2108, 111th Cong. § 5 (2009); Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act,
H.R. 1728, 111th Cong. § 206(a) (2009); Servicemembers Access to Justice Act of 2009,
S. 263, 111th Cong. § 3; Servicemembers Access to Justice Act of 2009, H.R. 1474,
111th Cong. § 3; Fairness in Nursing Home Arbitration Act, S. 512, 111th Cong. § 3
(2009); Fairness in Nursing Home Arbitration Act of 2009, H.R. 1237, 111th Cong. § 2;
Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, S. 931, 111th Cong. § 3; Arbitration Fairness Act of
2009, H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. § 4; Consumer Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 991, 111th
Cong. § 2.
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215

Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009 (AFA).
With one or two notable
216
exceptions, however, these congressional initiatives have all languished in committee without coming close to a formal vote.
Perhaps one explanation for why these proposed solutions have
failed to gain traction is that they threaten to send the pendulum swinging to the opposite extreme. Rather than seek a careful balancing of
217
state and federal interests, for example, Schwartz seeks nothing less
than to “correct” the Court’s “federalism mistakes” by returning to an
218
And although congressional
originalist interpretation of the FAA.
efforts have not sought quite the same overhaul of FAA preemption
law, legislative intervention by its nature paints in broad strokes. The
AFA, for instance, purported to invalidate all predispute agreements
to arbitrate (1) employment, consumer, or franchise disputes and (2)
219
disputes “arising under any statute intended to protect civil rights.”
There are surely reasons to be especially concerned about the use and
abuse of arbitration agreements in these contexts. But a complete
ban on such broadly worded subject areas takes what Rutledge has described as a “meat cleaver” approach to “an issue that requires a scal220
As but one example, consider that when the employee is a
pel.”
sought-after, high-level executive or the employer is a struggling start-

215

See S. 931, 111th Cong. § 3 (proposing a ban on arbitration of employment,
consumer, franchise, and civil rights disputes); see also Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009,
H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. § 4 (same).
216
See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1226 (2006) (permitting only postdispute arbitration
agreements in the context of motor vehicle franchise contracts); Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-118, § 8116(a), 123 Stat. 3409, 3454-55
(2009) (prohibiting contractors who receive funds under the Act from requiring employees and independent contractors to arbitrate Title VII, sexual harassment, and
similar disputes).
217
Justice Stevens sketched out an example of such an approach in his dissent
from Southland. See infra notes 223-24 and accompanying text. Stevens argued that
because legality of object is an essential element of any valid contract, states should
retain at least some ability to regulate arbitration agreements through legislation. See
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 20 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). In his view, preserving some state authority was particularly warranted in Southland given (1) the importance of franchise relationships to the state,
(2) the power imbalance between franchisors and franchisees, and (3) the state law’s
legitimate remedial goals. Id. Schwartz rejects this mediative approach, however,
because it “assum[es] that the FAA creates a substantive right enforceable in state
court.” Schwartz, supra note 210, at 50.
218
Schwartz, supra note 210, at 16; see also Pittman, supra note 18, at 798.
219
Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. § 4.
220
Peter B. Rutledge, The Case Against the Arbitration Fairness Act, DISP. RESOL.
MAG., Fall 2009, at 4, 7. Like me, Rutledge urges a more “calibrated solution” to the
problem of overpreemption. Id.
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up, a complete ban on arbitration clauses in employment contracts
221
may wreak the same type of unfairness that the AFA seeks to undo.
In these situations, the so-called “Arbitration Fairness Act” begins to
look less like a remedial bill and more like an unfair burden on free222
dom of contract.
In contrast to these approaches, judges are increasingly searching
for equilibrium. For his part, Justice Stevens has advocated applying a
certain degree of “scrutin[y]” and independent “judgment” to the FAA
preemption analysis, especially where state remedial statutes are
223
involved. Rather than relying on “sterile generalization,” he stressed
the importance of considering factors such as the state’s regulatory int224
erests and “the substance of the transaction at issue,” not just its form.
Similarly, Justice O’Connor has faulted the Court’s rigid preemption
tests for unnecessarily “displac[ing] many state statutes carefully cali225
brated to protect consumers.” For these and other jurists, the FAA’s
anti-discrimination ambitions do not necessarily preclude regulating
arbitration in the service of other, more pressing public values.
These concerns have so far found little voice in the Paradigm,
however. The current framework is woefully indifferent to the states’
regulatory interests—let alone the need for a balance between those
interests and the costs they impose on arbitration. Is there a better
way to reconcile the federal and state interests at stake in FAA
preemption, one that facilitates careful analysis in the form of case-bycase judicial scrutiny? The accumulated learning in the antidiscrimination area suggests an answer.
221

See E. Gary Spitko, Exempting High-Level Employees and Small Employers from Legislation Invalidating Predispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
591, 652-53 (2009).
222
Similarly, although it has been noted that franchisees have less bargaining
power than franchisors, it is difficult to appreciate why this alone should require validly
negotiated arbitration agreements between such parties to be voided in all cases. Unlike employees and consumers, franchisees tend to be businesses—businesses that in
turn employ individuals and provide services to consumers. See Note, Arbitration—
Congress Considers Bill to Invalidate Pre-Dispute Arbitration Clauses for Consumers, Employees,
and Franchisees, 121 HARV. L. REV. 2262, 2267-68 (2008).
223
See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 20 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
224
Id.
225
Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 282 (1995)
(O’Connor, J., concurring). Other courts have taken into consideration the gravity of
state interests when analyzing complex preemption cases that are not straightforwardly
resolvable under current FAA jurisprudence. See, e.g., Saturn Distrib. Corp. v. Williams,
905 F.2d 719, 728 (4th Cir. 1990) (Widener, J., dissenting); Flores v. Superior Court,
No. B168327, 2003 WL 22963075, at *7 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 17, 2003).
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B. Justified Discrimination
As we saw, the Paradigm resolves the tension between equal opportunity for arbitration and regulation for the public good by choosing the former over the latter. By contrast, anti-discrimination law
takes a more balanced approach, one that distinguishes between discrimination simpliciter and unjustified discrimination. It understands
that, without a threshold tolerance for some forms of de jure discrimination, “effective regulation in the public interest could not be pro226
vided, however essential that regulation might be.” Perfect equality,
227
in other words, is almost certainly dystopic.
Anti-discrimination law therefore wisely resists a blanket rule
against classification. In the equal protection context, this is captured
in the well-known concepts of “suspect” and “quasi-suspect” classifications. To say that a distinction drawn on the face of a statute is “suspect” rather than “forbidden” serves to remind us that the real issue is
not whether a law singles out a particular class but rather why it does
228
This leaves open the possibility that the classification might be
so.
justified—for instance, where it is not the result of invidious motives
or where it serves a weighty public purpose.
For example, even while applying heightened scrutiny, the Court
has upheld a variety of statutes in the gender context that single out
229
women for differential treatment.
In Califano v. Webster, the Court
upheld a Social Security Act provision that calculated benefits for men
and women differently because the provision did not reflect “‘tradi230
tional [and inaccurate] way[s] of thinking about females’” but rather sought to compensate for the “long history of discrimination
231
against women.” Similarly, in Schlesinger v. Ballard, the Court denied

226

Kotch v. Bd. of River Port Pilot Comm’rs, 330 U.S. 552, 556 (1947).
See Brest, supra note 114, at 15 (“A flat prohibition of race-dependent decisions
provides as much assurance as possible against discrimination, but at the cost of precluding what may be thought to be desirable uses of race . . . .”).
228
See, e.g., Perry, supra note 140, at 1046.
229
See, e.g., Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (California statutory
rape law that only applied to males); Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (Social
Security Act provision for calculating wages, partially based on gender); Schlesinger v.
Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975) (law treating male and female Navy officers differently);
Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974) (Florida property tax statute that treated widows
and widowers differently).
230
430 U.S. at 320 (quoting Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 223 (1977)); see
also Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 71-72 (1981) (upholding a gender-based classification that was not “unthinking[]” but instead the product of “studied choice”).
231
Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. at 317.
227
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an equal protection challenge to a naval discharge statute that applied
232
different termination criteria to males and females.
Rather than
“archaic and overbroad generalizations” about women, the statute was
grounded in the “demonstrable fact” that female officers had fewer
opportunities than their male counterparts to compile favorable ser233
vice records. The plain import of these cases and others like them is
that gender-based classifications may sometimes be justified if they are
not based on odious assumptions about a woman’s place in society.
In the Title VII context, the “bona fide occupational qualification”
(BFOQ) defense serves as a functional analog to the “quasi-suspect”
classification standard. The defense allows private employers to discriminate on the basis of a protected characteristic other than race if
they can prove that possession of the protected trait is “reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or
234
enterprise.”
In Dothard v. Rawlinson, the Court used the BFOQ
defense to uphold an explicit restriction on hiring women as guards
235
The Court reasoned that
in an all-male maximum security prison.
the hiring policy did not represent an “artificial, arbitrary, and
236
unnecessary barrier[] to employment” predicated on “stereotypical
237
assumptions” about a woman’s ability to perform on the job.
Instead, the policy merely reflected the perils of life in the prison,
supported by testimony that (1) twenty percent of prisoners had been
sex offenders, (2) “rampant violence” was commonplace, and (3)
female guards would not physically be able to maintain order as
238
Considerations of safety and
effectively as their male counterparts.
effective job performance, in other words, trumped a rule of absolute
239
equal treatment.

232

419 U.S. at 510.
Id. at 508.
234
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (2006).
235
See 433 U.S. 321, 366-37 (1977).
236
Id. at 328 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971)).
237
Id. at 334.
238
Id. at 334-35.
239
One can quibble with whether these exceptions should ever (and do ever) succeed in practice, especially in contexts such as race or gender. But this objection has
more to do with the factual context at issue than with the basic theoretical apparatus.
In theory, each of the anti-discrimination frameworks I discuss unmistakably recognizes
that classifications along otherwise impermissible lines must sometimes be tolerated in
order to achieve more pressing public interests. The fact that some contexts rarely present any reasons to tolerate discrimination does not invalidate that theory. Nor does it
necessarily cast doubt on the soundness of such reasons in the arbitration context.
233
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The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which endeavors among other things to eliminate discrimination in world
240
GATT Article XX permits intentrade, takes a similar approach.
tional discrimination by member states against the goods of other
241
contracting states in a finite set of circumstances.
These circumstances all have to do with regulation in the public interest—for example, to “protect public morals”; “to protect human, animal, or plant
life”; or “to secure compliance with [other] laws or regulations” not
242
Moreover, the so-called “chapeau” of Arinconsistent with GATT.
ticle XX makes clear that the exceptions may not be invoked to shield
243
“arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination.”
In other words, the exceptions apply only when the discrimination is defensible in light of
244
competing values.
Unlike these anti-discrimination regimes, the Paradigm’s “single
out” rule assumes there is never a reason to discriminate purposefully
against arbitration. To use the vocabulary of equal protection, this effectively makes arbitration not just a “suspect” class but rather a “for245
bidden” class—a class about which no distinctions may be drawn.
246
To call this a “hyper-demanding” standard, as some scholars have,
seems almost an understatement. For as a standard of nondiscrimination, the Paradigm provides more protection to arbitration than the
Equal Protection Clause and the Civil Rights Acts afford to gender
and to some degree even race. Gerald Gunther once said of the strict
247
scrutiny test that it is “‘strict’ in theory and fatal in fact.” The Para-

240

See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, A11, 55
U.N.T.S. 194, 196 [hereinafter GATT].
241
See id. art. XX.
242
Id. art. XX(a), (b), (d). Some GATT side agreements contain similar public
policy exceptions. See Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures, art. 2.1, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 493, 494 (permitting countries to take
measures that protect human life and health); Agreement on Technical Barriers to
Trade, art. 2.2, Apr. 15, 1994, 1868 U.N.T.S. 120, 121 (identifying countervailing values
such as the protection of human health or the environment as legitimate grounds for
discrimination).
243
See GATT, supra note 240, art. XX.
244
See id.
245
See Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 195, at 354.
246
Edward Brunet, The Appropriate Role of State Law in the Federal Arbitration System:
Choice and Preemption, in ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA 63, 69 (Edward Brunet et al.
eds., 2006). Brunet notes further that the “singling out” test “has no place in the normal arsenal of preemption inquiries.” Id.
247
Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term—Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).
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digm topples this standard in the preemption context by making discrimination against arbitration both fatal in theory and fatal in fact.
For these reasons, and consistent with what I have explained to be
arbitration’s “suspect” status, I argue that the Paradigm should no
longer preempt all enforcement-impeding state laws that target arbitration on their face. Instead, at the upper limit it should consider
such laws as suspect—as only potentially tainted by the type of unjusti248
fied discrimination that the FAA was designed to remedy. But arbitration’s “suspect” status also means that such laws must be scrutinized
more than laws that seek to regulate other types of agreements—what
249
For no
one judge tellingly described as “unprotected” contracts.
matter how rational, even arbitration-neutral state laws are suspicious
because the Court fears that they might rest on negative stereotypes of
the sort that continue to invoke a parade of horribles in the legal and
250
The Court’s own about-face in the nonarbipopular imagination.
trability area suggests “how tightly impulses hostile to arbitration must
251
be constrained in order to remain faithful to Congress’s mandate.”
The approach I advocate would enable states to honor the FAA’s
anti-discrimination mandate without abandoning all initiatives that
single out arbitration. It would open up a precious foothold for restoring the federal/state balance in the arbitration area where one has
252
seemed impossible for quite some time.
This foothold, moreover,
253
would not depend on potentially disastrous amendments to the FAA
or on rolling back the Court’s FAA jurisprudence to the status quo
prior to 1967, the year in which the Court vested FAA section 2 with
254
substantive preemptive power. My suggested approach also offers a
way for those who believe that the Court erred in Southland to find in
the anti-discrimination model a certain critical moment—a way of

248

See also Edward Brunet, The Minimal Role of Federalism and State Law in Arbitration, 8 NEV. L.J. 326, 328 (2007) (arguing that in determining whether the FAA
preempts state law, “courts should look for suspect state laws that prevent the fulfillment of the core policies underlying federal arbitration law”).
249
See Sec. Indus. Ass’n v. Connolly, 883 F.2d 1114, 1120 (1st Cir. 1989).
250
See supra notes 2-9 and accompanying text.
251
Connolly, 883 F.2d at 1119 n.2.
252
Even those like Stephen Hayford and Alan Palmiter, who argue that state arbitration law has an interstitial role to play in the Court’s ambitious preemption program, would agree that the Paradigm almost completely forecloses state regulation of
both “front end” and “back end” issues. See, e.g., Hayford & Palmiter, supra note 29, at
205; Hayford, supra note 17, at 75.
253
See supra notes 219-22 and accompanying text.
254
See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 405 (1967).
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holding the Court to the full implications of its own (arguably mistaken) interpretation of the FAA.
Finally, my approach is not inconsistent with the basic thrust of the
Court’s existing FAA jurisprudence. The Court’s core concern has always been with laws or legal principles that “take[] [their] meaning
255
precisely from the fact that a contract to arbitrate is at issue” —that is,
laws that can be traced back to unfounded biases against arbitration
256
qua arbitration. Although the Court has sometimes warned that the
FAA categorically “foreclose[s] state legislative attempts to undercut
257
the enforceability of arbitration agreements,” at other times it has
spoken in less sweeping terms, suggesting that the true problem lies
with state laws that discriminate against arbitration for no good reason:
What States may not do is decide that a contract is fair enough to enforce
all its basic terms (price, service, credit), but not fair enough to enforce its
arbitration clause. The [FAA] makes any such state policy unlawful, for
that kind of policy would place arbitration clauses on an unequal “foot258
ing,” directly contrary to the [FAA]’s language and Congress’ intent.

If I am correct that the Court’s FAA jurisprudence accords arbitration agreements more than the baseline constitutional protection afforded to all contracts, but something less than the absolute protection
that would be accorded to a forbidden class, what level of “scrutiny”
should be used to determine whether discrimination against arbitration agreements is consistent with the FAA? My purpose in this Article
is not to argue for a precise standard of FAA scrutiny. Rather, it is to
suggest that any level of scrutiny is better than the current state of no
scrutiny at all. For now, the important point is that whether a law “singles out” arbitration should not be the end but rather the beginning of
the analysis—an analysis that should balance the Paradigm’s antidiscrimination mandate against competing state interests.
C. Potential Objections
Before illustrating how these insights could be used to resolve
concrete preemption issues, I pause here to address three common
critiques of the anti-discrimination model that I have so far developed.

255

Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987).
See supra Section II.A. As I explained in Section II.B, the Court has more recently scrutinized even perfectly reasonable generalizations about arbitration on the
theory that they, too, might conceal a bias against arbitration.
257
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984).
258
Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995).
256
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The first is that, even if the FAA’s purpose is to reverse only unjustified hostility toward arbitration, there are good policy grounds to
adopt a bright-line rule of preemption for all state laws that single out
arbitration. By contrast, a case-by-case approach of the sort I advocate
would make the FAA preemption analysis unnecessarily complicated
and time consuming, thereby inviting abuse.
Policy considerations, however, actually militate in the opposite
direction: toward more nuance and refinement in the preemption
analysis. Obstacle preemption is not a question capable of being re259
solved “in the abstract,” based on the form rather than the substance
of the state law at issue; instead, it requires a careful consideration of
“the relationship between state and federal laws as they are interpreted
260
and applied, not merely as they are written.” Moreover, in practice,
[o]bstacle-preemption claims are among the most difficult defenses for
the person claiming that an obstacle exists. The challenger must show
the specific federal objective was selected by Congress and that the particular state law was inconsistent with it. Very persuasive advocates who
assert the preemption defense must enlist the judge to discern the purposes of the state law and the federal law in the same manner in which
261
the advocate sees those purposes.

From this perspective, the single-out/general test dramatically simplifies the ordinarily complex obstacle-preemption analysis. My approach merely restores a baseline sophistication to that analysis in the
arbitration context.
The second type of critique is to question the practicality of an in262
tent-based FAA preemption test.
But obstacle-preemption analysis
already requires considering the intention behind a state statute and
263
whether it conflicts with the purpose of the related federal statute.
Moreover, scholars have advocated precisely this type of inquiry in the
264
Judges frustrated with the limitations of
FAA preemption context.
259

Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 56 F.3d 151, 195 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (quoting
Alascom, Inc. v. FCC, 727 F.2d 1212, 1220 (D.C. Cir. 1984)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
260
Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 526 (1977).
261
JAMES T. O’REILLY, FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW 75 (2006)
(footnotes omitted).
262
I address this criticism in more detail elsewhere. See Aragaki, supra note 27
(manuscript Section III.A).
263
See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5.2.5 at 414, 415-16 (3d
ed. 2006); O’REILLY, supra note 261, at 75.
264
Consider the seminal case of Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681
(1996), in which the Court held that the FAA preempted a Montana law requiring arbitration clauses to be printed in underlined capital letters on the contract’s front
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the Paradigm have also pointed to the countervailing values embodied
265
in state legislation as a reason to avoid preemption.
And because
arbitration is a “matter of consent, not coercion,” in certain circumstances it is well established that the intent of the contracting parties
266
determines whether the FAA preempts state law.
The third and strongest objection is that the plain language of the
FAA mandates a rule of absolute nondiscrimination. Recall that section
2 provides for arbitration agreements to be “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable” unless there are “grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
267
revocation of any contract.”
Enforcement-impeding laws that single
out arbitration do not, by definition, fit within this so-called “savings
clause.” Thus, regardless of whether they justifiably discriminate against
arbitration, all such laws appear inconsistent with the text of the FAA.
Although this textual argument has a certain appeal, it does not provide
the best interpretation of section 2 for the following reasons.
First, the well-established public policy defense to contract
268
formation constitutes a ground for the revocation of “any contract.”
It follows that courts should be entitled to apply this defense without
269
offending the FAA. For instance, if a state statute makes it illegal to
print arbitration clauses in anything other than underlined capital
letters, nothing in the plain language of section 2 should prevent courts
from using the public policy defense to deny enforcement of nonconforming clauses. The bare words of section 2, therefore, do not
unmistakably require the preemption of enforcement-impeding laws
that single out arbitration.
Nonetheless, as a practical matter, this creates a loophole that
would allow states to use the letter of section 2 to do an end run around
the FAA. As the Court explained in its watershed Southland opinion, if
page. Many scholars have criticized Casarotto on the ground that the Court should
have factored in the purpose of the Montana notice provision, which was merely to
“make sure that its citizens knew when an arbitration provision was included in a contract.” Moses, supra note 64, at 542. Because the interests served by the Montana law
were consistent with the FAA, they argued, the law should not have been preempted.
See, e.g., Brunet, supra note 246, at 71; Moses, supra note 64, at 542; Sternlight, supra
note 18, at 667.
265
See supra note 225 and accompanying text.
266
See Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S.
468, 479 (1989); see also Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52,
63-64 (1995).
267
9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
268
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (1981); 5 RICHARD A. LORD,
WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 12:1 (4th ed. 2009).
269
See, e.g., Feeney v. Dell Inc., 908 N.E.2d 753, 768 (Mass. 2009).
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the public policy defense were left intact, “states could wholly eviscerate
[the] congressional intent to place arbitration agreements ‘upon the
same footing as other contracts,’ simply by passing statutes” targeting
270
arbitration for unfavorable treatment. Thus, the real reason the FAA
preempts state law has more to do with considerations of policy and
purpose than with fealty to the statutory text. And as explained above,
in Southland, the Court described those purposes using a textbook
metaphor for equal opportunity, suggesting that the anti-discrimination
model is consistent with the basic foundations of FAA preemption.
Second, the historical record suggests that proponents of the FAA
never intended to preclude all manner of laws that singled out
arbitration. Thus, even while it sought to make arbitrable “every other
271
possible subject of controversy in contract and tort,” the New York
arbitration law on which the FAA was based prohibited the submission
to arbitration of any “controversy [that] arises respecting a claim to an
272
estate in real property, in fee or for life.” Similarly, the Pennsylvania
arbitration statute in effect in 1924 prohibited arbitration of disputes
273
Likewise, many
arising out of a “contract for personal services.”
state arbitration statutes patterned after the New York arbitration law
274
These proviexcluded labor arbitrations from within their scope.
sions were undoubtedly known to the reformers, yet there is no indication in the historical record that the reformers perceived them as
275
antithetical to the FAA. In short, the history of the FAA, like its text,

270

Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 n.11 (1984) (citation omitted)
(quoting H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1 (1924)).
271
Wheless, supra note 96, at 222.
272
New York Civil Practice Act § 1448, cl. 2 (1928), reprinted in CLEVENGER’S PRACTICE
MANUAL OF NEW YORK 682-83 ( Joseph R. Clevenger ed., 1928); see also WIS. STAT.
§ 298.01(1)(b) (1927) (proscribing arbitration in cases relating to real estate); STURGES,
supra note 85, §§ 88–140 (reprinting relevant portions of state statutes in effect as of 1930).
273
PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 606a-1 to -2 (Supp. 1928).
274
See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 4294–4301 (1928); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§§ 1280–1293 (1927); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 405–422 (1932); An Act to Make Enforceable Agreements for the Arbitration of Disputes, 1929 N.H. Laws 172, 172-74; An Act
to Make Valid and Enforceable Written Provisions or Agreements for the Arbitration
of Disputes, 1929 R.I. Pub. Laws 292, 292-98. The New York statute did not, however,
provide such an exception.
275
Indeed, they were challenged—albeit unsuccessfully—as arbitrary and unreasonable classifications in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g., Pac. Indem.
Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 25 F.2d 930, 932 (9th Cir. 1928); Katakura & Co. v. Vogue
Silk Hosiery Co., 15 Pa. D. & C. 389, 393 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1931), aff’d, 161 A. 529, 530 (Pa.
1932). Even after such statutes were upheld, reformers did not appear to have sought
state legislative amendment.
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is not unavoidably inconsistent with the proposition that states may
single out arbitration agreements in certain contexts.
Finally, bear in mind that my overall argument is built on the
Court’s FAA preemption jurisprudence rather than on the FAA itself.
As noted above, that jurisprudence does not necessarily follow from
anything in the FAA’s language or legislative history.
D. Application
Given a statute that singles out a suspect or quasi-suspect class,
equal protection jurisprudence applies heightened scrutiny to determine whether the facial classification is justifiable. That justification
turns on (1) the gravity of the state interests favoring discrimination
and (2) the fit between those interests and the means chosen to further them. A similar inquiry obtains in the Title VII context. Pursuant to the BFOQ defense, an employer may discriminate on the basis of national origin or gender (but not race) if (1) the reason for the
discrimination is important enough to touch the “essence of the busi276
ness” and (2) the regulation is “reasonably necessary” for that pur277
pose.
By the same token, signatories to GATT are entitled to override the treaty’s nondiscrimination principle as long as any
discriminatory measure both (1) serves substantial regulatory interests
such as the protection of human or animal life and (2) is “necessary”
278
to achieve those interests.
Distilling these precedents, I propose the following inquiry for
determining whether the FAA preempts a state law that singles out
arbitration: First, the Paradigm should consider the gravity of the
279
state interest behind the law.
Second, it should inquire into the
280
means/ends fit between those interests and the law as drafted.
As an example, consider the seminal case of Doctor’s Associates, Inc.
281
v. Casarotto, in which franchisees sued the franchisor of a Subway
chain for breach of contract and fraud. The franchise agreement’s
arbitration clause required the Montana-based franchisees to arbitrate
276

Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir. 1971).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (2006).
278
GATT, supra note 240, art. XX(b).
279
This is also consistent with Edward Brunet’s argument that FAA preemption
should involve a consideration of both federal and state interests at stake. See Brunet,
supra note 248, at 328-29.
280
Again, the precise standard of scrutiny to be applied in these inquiries is an issue that I defer to another day. See supra text following note 258.
281
517 U.S. 681 (1996).
277
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their claims in the franchisor’s home state of Connecticut.
The
franchisees were also required to pay half of the arbitration expenses
(including the arbitrators’ fees and travel expenses), administrative
283
charges of $150 per day, and a filing fee of up to $4,000.
At the time, Montana law imposed a statewide requirement that
arbitration clauses be “typed in underlined capital letters on the first
284
page of the contract,” regardless of the subject matter of the contract
or the relationship between the contracting parties. Because the
parties’ agreement did not comply with this law, the franchisees argued
285
The Court held
that their promise to arbitrate was unenforceable.
that the FAA preempted the Montana law because the law “singl[ed]
286
out arbitration provisions for suspect status” and thereby placed
287
them “on an unequal ‘footing’” relative to other agreements.
The Court was literally correct that Montana did not require other
clauses in the contract likewise to be typed in underlined, capital letters
288
in order to be enforceable. But is this the type of unequal treatment
about which the FAA is (or should be) concerned? Does it suggest any
hostility or lingering anti-arbitration bias of the kind that the Court
289
The Paradigm has no occasion to consider these
seeks to reverse?
questions because the fact that the law is enforcement impeding and
singles out arbitration brings the inquiry to a screeching halt.
An anti-discrimination approach would not necessarily arrive at
the same conclusion. To be sure, the classification drawn on the face
of the statute would trigger a suspicion that the statute is singling out
arbitration clauses because of problematic biases or generalizations
about the arbitration process. But there are arguably legitimate state
interests behind the Montana law—interests that may have little to do
with discrimination and more to do with protecting the unwary from
unknowingly waiving constitutional rights that they do not expect
282

See Lombardi I, 886 P.2d 931, 935 (Mont. 1994), vacated, 515 U.S. 1129 (1995).
Id. In addition, because Connecticut law governed the franchise agreement,
the franchisees would have had to hire Connecticut counsel. See id.
284
Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 683 (quoting MONT. CODE. ANN. § 27-5-114(4) (1995))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
285
Lombardi I, 886 P.2d at 933.
286
Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 687.
287
Id. at 686 (quoting Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281
(1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
288
See id. at 687.
289
David Schwartz raises this same question when distinguishing between hostility
toward arbitration based on considerations of “jurisdiction and judicial administration”
and of contract validity. See Schwartz, supra note 210, at 52.
283
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290

(and might not wish) to waive in this context. Moreover, the means
chosen to further those interests do not appear excessive: instead of
invalidating all arbitration clauses, the law simply voids those that do
291
not comply with relatively trivial notice requirements.
Alternatively, one might argue that the means chosen by the
state legislature were in fact ill-fitting and overinclusive, for the law
also voids nonconforming arbitration clauses between sophisticated
parties—parties who, unlike the franchisees in Casarotto, would not
need the benefit of the law and might very well use the inadvertent
failure to comply with it as an excuse to avoid arbitration ex post.
From this perspective, the law as drafted appears more suspicious
than it otherwise would have if, for instance, it had been limited in
scope to franchise agreements or other transactions known to
involve pronounced disparities in bargaining power. Whether these
considerations are sufficient to suggest unjustified discrimination
will ultimately depend on how closely the law is scrutinized under
292
the test I propose.
IV. UNDERPREEMPTION AND THE PROBLEM OF PRETEXT
If the Paradigm applies an unyielding standard to state laws that
single out arbitration, it retreats to the other extreme when it comes
to generally applicable laws. By and large, the Paradigm presumes
that a state law or rule regulating contracts as a group does not express any hostility toward arbitration and for that reason is not
293
But as any student of anti-discrimination
preempted by the FAA.
law will appreciate, it is entirely possible to apply a facially neutral law
in discriminatory ways. This introduces the problem of pretext: the
possibility that courts may be concealing lingering anti-arbitration bias
294
Preemption conbehind the mask of “general” contract defenses.
cerns are just as salient here as they were in the case of statutes that
single out arbitration. Traditional conflict-preemption analysis re-

290

See Casarotto v. Lombardi (Lombardi II ), 901 P.2d 596, 599 (Mont. 1995) (Leaphart, J., concurring), rev’d, 517 U.S. 681 (1996); Lombardi I, 886 P.2d at 935, 939, vacated, 515 U.S. 1129 (1995).
291
Similarly, some have offered the law’s arguably slight impact on arbitration as a
reason why the law should not have been preempted. See, e.g., Hayford, supra note 17,
at 71; Sternlight, supra note 18, at 667.
292
Again, for reasons of economy I leave questions regarding the level of scrutiny
for another day.
293
See Figure 1, supra Section I.B.
294
See, e.g., Rau, supra note 181, at 20, 21-22; Ware, supra note 73, at 1034.
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quires courts to consider the relevant state and federal laws not just as
295
they are written but also “as they are interpreted and applied.”
In this Part, I focus on enforcement-impeding laws that apply to
all or substantially all contracts—in particular, the unconscionability
defense. My aim here is to challenge the inverse of the assumption
considered in Part III, namely: “[I]f [a state] law arose to govern issues concerning the validity, revocability, and enforceability of contracts generally,” it is necessarily unproblematic from an anti296
discrimination perspective.
A. Unconscionability and the “New Judicial Hostility”
For some time, unconscionability functioned like a safety valve
on FAA preemption, giving judges the flexibility to invalidate problematic arbitration agreements that legislatures could not regulate
297
without running afoul of the single-out/general test.
In recent
years, however, academics and practitioners alike have suggested
that the doctrine may be operating less as a shield against the Paradigm’s relentless preemptive effect and more as a sword in the ser298
vice of a new but stealthful “judicial hostility” to arbitration.
In her study of unconscionability cases, for example, Susan Randall reports a tangible increase both in the frequency with which litigants raise unconscionability challenges against arbitration agreements and in the rate at which courts hold those agreements to be
299
unconscionable.
In the 2002 to 2003 period, Randall reports that
68.5% of all unconscionability cases involved arbitration agreements,
300
compared with just 14.8% twenty years earlier. In the same period,
courts found 50.3% of the arbitration agreements to be unconscionable but only 25.6% of the nonarbitration agreements—a rate two

295

Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 526 (1977).
Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987).
297
See, e.g., Bruhl, supra note 168, at 1422; McGuinness & Karr, supra note 180, at
61; Stempel, supra note 183, at 765-66.
298
See Burton, supra note 30, at 489-500; Riske, supra note 31, at 600-01; Stempel,
supra note 183, at 773-75. See generally McGuinness & Karr, supra note 180, at 62 (arguing that the FAA allows courts to apply general contract principles in a manner hostile to arbitration agreements); Susan Randall, Judicial Attitudes Toward Arbitration and
the Resurgence of Unconscionability, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 185, 186 (2004) (arguing that judges
perpetuate the historic hostility toward arbitration by “expand[ing] the doctrine of
unconscionability . . . to revoke arbitration agreements”).
299
See Randall, supra note 298, at 194-96.
300
Id.
296
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301

times higher for arbitration agreements.
In a similar study, AaronAndrew Bruhl observes that unconscionability-related arbitration cases
increased year over year from less than 1% of all arbitration cases in
302
1994 to more than 18% in 2007.
To be sure, a spike in numbers standing alone is hardly conclusive
evidence of discriminatory treatment. But there are other indications
that anti-arbitration bias within the judiciary is alive and well. Practitioners have begun to accuse judges of “creat[ing] a new brand of unconscionability” that is “far more demanding” and “unique to arbitra303
tion.”
Judges, too, have noted that their colleagues’ unconscionability decisions are sometimes “written ostensibly to apply general
principles of contract law, [but] they hold that an agreement to arbitrate may be unconscionable simply because it is an agreement to ar304
bitrate.” The empirical data, together with this qualitative evidence,
have led some to suggest quite persuasively that “[m]any courts . . . seize upon the unconscionability doctrine as a pretext to refuse en305
forcement” of arbitration agreements. I shall refer to such critics as
the “pretextualists.”
The problem of pretext has been a central theme in antidiscrimination law. In the equal protection context, for example,
courts are keenly attuned to the danger that state actors might apply
benign laws or rules in ways that betray “enmity or prejudice . . . and
306
other improper influences and motives easy of concealment.”
Likewise, GATT provides that the Article XX exceptions should not
be “applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary
or unjustifiable discrimination . . . or a disguised restriction on inter307
national trade.”
308
By comparison, the Paradigm is naïve to these dangers.
It cannot discern discrimination in the case-by-case application of unconscio301

Id. at 194.
Bruhl, supra note 168, at 1440.
303
McGuinness & Karr, supra note 180, at 62.
304
Gay v. CreditInform, 511 F.3d 369, 395 (3d Cir. 2007).
305
Burton, supra note 30, at 500.
306
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373 (1886).
307
GATT, supra note 240, art. XX (emphasis added).
308
See Burton, supra note 30, at 483 (observing that “[e]xisting case law does not
resolve this tension”); Drahozal, supra note 41, at 411 (observing that “[l]ower courts
generally have rejected” FAA preemption challenges to the application of a contract
defense and that the Supreme Court “so far has not addressed the issue”); J. Maria
Glover, Beyond Unconscionability: Class Action Waivers and Mandatory Arbitration Agreements, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1735, 1756-57 (2006) (considering claims that courts are apply302
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nability doctrine because the analysis stops at the question of whether
the law is general or arbitration-specific; that is, the Paradigm’s singleout/general test fails to pierce through the form of the law to consider
309
how the law is being applied in substance. Thus, general contract defenses such as unconscionability are immunized from further risk of
preemption in the very first step of Drahozal’s four-step model of FAA
310
Drahozal’s test accurately reflects the Paradigm’s (inpreemption.
accurate) assumption that “[i]f the law applies to contracts generally,
311
it is not preempted.”
Even where one party explicitly argues that the lower court used
312
unconscionability “in a manner ‘inherently hostile’ to arbitration,”
reviewing courts have been content to deflect the preemption challenge solely on the ground that unconscionability is part of the law of
313
And while a few courts have been astute enough to obcontracts.
serve that they may not “employ . . . general doctrines in ways that sub314
ject arbitration clauses to special scrutiny,” none has provided a
meaningful test for discerning precisely when such scrutiny has been
employed. If the pretextualists are correct that the old judicial hostility is now masquerading behind the unconscionability doctrine, the
315
Paradigm does not appear to be effective at uncloaking it.

ing unconscionability doctrine more strictly to class action waivers in arbitration
agreements but concluding that FAA preemption is not “foolproof” and does not forbid the practice).
309
See supra note 63.
310
See Drahozal, supra note 41, at 407-08.
311
Id. Drahozal himself is more skeptical of this proposition. He eventually asks
whether, “as applied,” general contract law defenses might nonetheless be considered
to single out arbitration. Id. at 411.
312
Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1152 (9th Cir. 2003).
313
See, e.g., Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849, 857 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that “‘because unconscionability is a generally applicable contract defense,’” it is
never preempted (quoting Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 498 F.3d 976,
988 (9th Cir. 2007))), cert. granted sub nom. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 130 S.
Ct. 3322 (2010) (No. 09-0893); Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1170
n.3 (9th Cir. 2003) (rejecting as “plainly without merit” an argument that California
unconscionability precedents “impose[] a heightened standard for enforcement of
arbitration agreements”); Hall v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 608 F. Supp. 2d 592, 597 (D.N.J.
2009) (denying preemption challenge to unconscionability defense on the ground
that courts have “routinely” held the defense to be generally applicable).
314
Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 379 F.3d 159, 167 (5th
Cir. 2004).
315
Aaron-Andrew Bruhl offers another explanation for why reviewing courts have
not scrutinized adverse unconscionability findings in the lower courts more aggressively.
He argues that such courts might entertain “expressive” concerns about accusing a trial
judge of misinterpreting, or perhaps even manipulating, the unconscionability doctrine

ARAGAKI REVISED FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

Arbitration’s Suspect Status

4/13/2011 1:27 PM

1289

B. “As Applied” Challenges and the Limits of the Single-Out/General Test
In response to the Paradigm’s lackadaisical approach to these
problems, pretextualists have sought more aggressively to infer judicial
hostility toward arbitration by refocusing the single-out/general test at
316
the level of application.
From an anti-discrimination perspective,
however, the test proves no more effective here than it did in the context of the statutes considered in Part IV. It makes no sense to say, for
example, that courts may not “rely on the uniqueness of an agreement
to arbitrate” when determining whether the agreement is uncon317
scionable. Or, to take a more extreme iteration, that “courts may not
318
Uneven consider the fact that a contract to arbitrate is at issue.”
conscionability requires precisely the type of case-by-case determination
319
about particular arbitration clauses that these rules purport to forbid.
It eschews standardized tests and instead requires courts to weigh individualized factors such as “the commercial setting, purpose, and effect

out of hostility toward arbitration. See Bruhl, supra note 168, at 1454-55. From a judicial federalism perspective, Bruhl notes that these “expressive” concerns may be most
pronounced when the Court is asked to review state supreme court decisions. Id.
316
See, e.g., Burton, supra note 30, at 483-85; McGuinness & Karr, supra note 180,
at 84.
317
Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987); accord Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v.
Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 n.3 (1996). As noted above, these statements are dicta.
See supra note 63.
The recent case of Gay v. CreditInform, 511 F.3d 369 (3d Cir. 2007), illustrates the
absurdity of insisting that courts may not apply the unconscionability doctrine in a way
that singles out arbitration contracts. The consumer in that case, Mary Gay, credibly
argued that her arbitration agreement was substantively unconscionable because it
contained a class action ban that, for all practical purposes, rendered her small consumer claim nonactionable. Id. at 393. But because this argument necessarily “relie[d] on the uniqueness of the arbitration provision”—namely, the fact that it contained a class action ban—the Third Circuit held that the FAA would preempt an
unconscionability determination based on such an argument. Id. at 395.
318
McGuinness & Karr, supra note 180, at 84; see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari
at 4, Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Gentry, 552 U.S. 1296 (2008) (No. 07-0998) (cert. denied) (arguing that the FAA should preempt a state court unconscionability finding
because it “depend[s] on the fact that an arbitration agreement is at issue”). To be
sure, McGuinness and Karr recognize the tension inherent in this proposition and
conclude, more or less consistent with the argument I seek to develop here, that “[t]he
only apparent means of reconciling” the tension is to return to the fundamental antidiscrimination purpose of the FAA: “to ‘reverse centuries of judicial hostility to arbitration agreements by placing them on equal footing with other contracts.’” McGuinness & Karr, supra note 180, at 78 (quoting Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon,
482 U.S. 220, 225-26 (1987)).
319
See, e.g., 2A LARY LAWRENCE, ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 2-302:27 (3d ed. 2008).
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of the particular clause or contract” in question.
Thus, if FAA
preemption of a general contract defense were to hinge on whether
application of the defense to an arbitration clause singles out that
321
clause, no possible application would survive preemptive scrutiny.
A more promising approach may be to follow the Court’s admonition that judges may not “decide that a contract is fair enough to enforce all its basic terms (price, service, credit), but not fair enough to
322
enforce its arbitration clause.”
Some pretextualists have taken this
as a cue to compare the outcome of unconscionability challenges in arbitration cases and in otherwise identical nonarbitration cases. Thus,
when a court finds unconscionable an arbitration clause that requires
the consumer or employee to resolve disputes in a distant forum, but
the same court “reach[es] a different conclusion” with regard to a
323
contract that does not call for arbitration, some infer hostility from
the bare fact of these disparate outcomes.
But this line of inquiry, too, is fraught with complexity, because unconscionability analysis is itself notoriously opaque and vests a great
deal of discretion in the trial judge. This lack of transparency is precisely what led scholars such as Arthur Leff to warn that the unconscionability doctrine “make[s] the true bases of decisions more hidden” and allows a court “to be nondisclosive about the basis of its decision even to
324
325
itself.”
Moreover, persuasive “apples-to-apples” comparisons between unconscionability determinations in arbitration and nonarbitra326
Indeed, sometimes there is
tion contexts are few and far between.
327
simply no relevant nonarbitration comparison point at all.
320

8 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 18:11 (4th ed. 2010); see also
U.C.C. § 2-302(2) (2001); 2A LAWRENCE, supra note 319, § 2-302:104.
321
Others before me have argued this point better than space permits me to do
here. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 210, at 51.
322
Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995). Like the statements in Perry, 482 U.S. at 492 n.9, and Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 687 n.3, this, too, is dictum.
See supra note 63. Regardless, it is nonsensical. As David Schwartz has observed, it is entirely in keeping with the purpose of the unconscionability doctrine to decide that a particular arbitration clause is unfair (and to reform or void just that clause) even though
remaining clauses in the container contract are not. See Schwartz, supra note 210, at 51.
323
See Randall, supra note 298, at 216; see also Burton, supra note 30, at 495.
324
Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code—The Emperor’s New Clause, 115
U. PA. L. REV. 485, 557 (1967).
325
Bruhl, supra note 168, at 1450.
326
I refer the reader to Bruhl’s more extended treatment of this point. See id. at
1449-52.
327
See id. (“[S]ome contractual issues arise exclusively or nearly exclusively in the
arbitration context, which means that there is no ready and obvious nonarbitration
baseline . . . .”); Randall, supra note 298, at 218-20 (noting that the confidential nature
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Nor would we necessarily wish to insist on parity in outcomes.
The advantage of unconscionability is its context-specific policing of
328
unfairness: its ability to serve as a “safety net” in circumstances
where unfairness would escape detection by more predictable brightline rules. A test of outcome equivalence would not only be difficult
to administer in practice, it would also straightjacket judges in a way
that threatens to defeat the benefits of the unconscionability rule.
Moreover, even if we were to agree that courts reach different
conclusions about unconscionability in arbitration and nonarbitration
cases, there may be perfectly reasonable explanations for these discrepancies that have little to do with unjustified hostility. For instance, Randall takes issue with California courts that find forumselection clauses unconscionable in arbitration agreements but not in
329
But a closer look at these cases reveals a much
other agreements.
more complex picture. Both the arbitration and nonarbitration cases
cited by Randall acknowledged that forum-selection clauses are prima
facie valid and must be enforced unless unreasonable under the cir330
Although it is possible to speculate that courts nonecumstances.
theless applied this rule more rigorously to arbitration agreements,
the unique facts of each case are quite consistent with the opposite
conclusion. Consider that Randall’s arbitration cases generally involved extremely small claims when compared to the cost of traveling
to the distant forum, together with other indicia of substantive un331
By contrast, in Randall’s nonarbitration examples,
conscionability.
of arbitration, which might be a factor in the unconscionability analysis, “has no exact
analogue” in litigation).
328
See generally Amy J. Schmitz, Embracing Unconscionability’s Safety Net Function, 58
ALA. L. REV. 73 (2006) (arguing that flexibility and the lack of clear rules are strengths,
not weaknesses, of the unconscionability doctrine).
329
Randall, supra note 298, at 214-16.
330
Although the standards employed in the arbitration and nonarbitration cases
are similar, they are not identical. In the arbitration cases Randall cites, the issue was
always whether the forum-selection clause was substantively and procedurally unconscionable. See, e.g., Wilmot v. McNabb, 269 F. Supp. 2d 1203, 1210 (N.D. Cal. 2003). In
the nonarbitration cases, the question was whether the forum-selection clause was “unreasonable” under the test articulated in The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1,
10 (1972). This is not necessarily a problem for Randall’s analysis, however, if it is just
as difficult (or more difficult) to prove unconscionability as it is to prove unreasonableness under the Bremen test.
331
See Wilmot, 269 F. Supp. 2d at 1211 (finding unconscionable an arbitration
clause that required an infirm elderly couple to arbitrate their claims in Colorado,
even though they lived in California and the defendant had offices throughout the
country); Comb v. Paypal, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1177 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (holding
unconscionable an arbitration clause that required nationwide customers to arbitrate
in “PayPal’s backyard” and that also exhibited other indicia of one-sidedness); GMAC
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the plaintiff either failed to adduce evidence that the forum-selection
clause was substantively unconscionable or did not bother to argue
332
the point.
These observations suggest that the single-out/general test is at
best an imperfect surrogate for the real issue that troubles the pretextualists. That issue, to quote the California Supreme Court, is whether
lower court judges are “us[ing] . . . such defenses [improperly] to dis333
criminate against arbitration clauses.” The pretextualists have similarly framed the issue in terms of discrimination, but they stop short of
334
building on this insight.
In the next section, I pick up where the pretextualists leave off.
Continuing with unconscionability as an example, I ask whether looking to the anti-discrimination paradigm can help us articulate a more
cogent standard for determining when and why the FAA should
preempt certain applications of general contract defenses.

Commercial Fin. LLC v. Superior Court, No. B166070, 2003 WL 21398319, at *4 (Cal.
Ct. App. June 18, 2003) (holding “[t]he combination of the New York forum selection
clause and the New York choice of law provision” contained in an arbitration clause to
be unconscionable as to a California clothing manufacturer); Stone v. Memberworks
Inc., No. G030740, 2003 WL 21246771, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. May 30, 2003) (“To require
a consumer in California, alleging a claim under California law, to arbitrate a dispute
in Connecticut concerning one or two hundred dollars . . . is ‘overly harsh’ and ‘onesided.’”); Bolter v. Superior Court, 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 888, 894 (Ct. App. 2001) (holding
unconscionable a forum-selection provision that a “large international corporation”
imposed on “small ‘Mom and Pop’ franchisees” as a condition of continuing their almost twenty-year-old franchise).
332
See generally Net2Phone, Inc. v. Superior Court, 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 149, 153 (Ct.
App. 2003) (holding that a New Jersey venue clause in a national company’s license
agreement was not unreasonable simply because the agreement was presented on a
“take it or leave it” basis); Intershop Commc’ns AG v. Superior Court, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d
847, 854 (Ct. App. 2002) (holding that a clause selecting Germany as the dispute resolution forum was not unreasonable where the plaintiff made no showing that “substantial justice could not be achieved” in Germany or that the clause was otherwise substantively unconscionable). In one case, the court understandably rejected a Canadian
plaintiff’s claim that his Canadian insurance policy’s requirement to resolve disputes in
Canada was unreasonable. See generally Shepherd v. Dominion of Can. Gen. Ins. Co.,
No. D039718, 2003 WL 21388251 (Cal. Ct. App. June 17, 2003).
333
Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1112-13 (Cal. 2005); accord
Banc One Acceptance Corp. v. Hill, 367 F.3d 426, 432 (5th Cir. 2004); Bruhl, supra
note 168, at 1451, 1454-55.
334
McGuinness and Karr, for example, draw an explicit analogy between their critique of California courts’ unconscionability decisions—which they claim ought to be
preempted by the FAA—and an “as applied” challenge to a facially neutral law under the
Equal Protection Clause. See McGuinness & Karr, supra note 180, at 78 n.145; see also Burton, supra note 30, at 483; Randall, supra note 298, at 194; Riske, supra note 31, at 600-02.
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C. Proving Pretextual Discrimination
Anti-discrimination law offers a helpful framework for approaching the problem of underpreemption in part because it disaggregates
two distinct paths to proving discriminatory treatment that the pretextualists have sometimes managed to conflate: establishing invidious motives and establishing disproportionate outcomes. Statutory
anti-discrimination law captures this distinction through the concepts
335
of “disparate treatment” and “disparate impact” claims, respectively.
A claim of disparate treatment amounts to a claim of purposeful,
unjustified discrimination. Disparate impact, by contrast, represents a
much more capacious view of discrimination that takes into account the
accreted effects of unconscious prejudice and historical subordination
that are beyond the control of any one actor. In other words, disparate
impact theory recognizes that unequal treatment may occur in the absence of purposeful or conscious misconduct—indeed, that sometimes
the unintended and seemingly benign forms of discrimination are
336
most in need of correction. Disparate impact theory therefore allows
the trier of fact to infer discriminatory treatment from suspiciously
337
unequal outcomes alone, regardless of the defendant’s motivation.
It is certainly possible to understand the pretextualists to be
arguing that there is something inherently problematic when arbitration agreements are overrepresented year after year in the set of contracts that courts deem unconscionable. But such an argument would
be seriously misconceived for a number of reasons. First, it presupposes a more robust anti-discrimination agenda for the FAA—
something approaching an anti-subordination principle of the sort

335

See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977) (explaining the difference between the two types of claims). Many anti-discrimination
scholars have questioned the salience of the treatment/impact distinction. See, e.g.,
Sheila R. Foster, Causation in Antidiscrimination Law: Beyond Intent Versus Impact, 41
HOUS. L. REV. 1469, 1474-76, 1547-48 (2005); George Rutherglen, Disparate Impact, Discrimination, and the Essentially Contested Concept of Equality, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2313,
2314-22 (2006).
336
See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430, 432 (1971) (holding in
the Title VII context that “good intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not
redeem employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as ‘built-in headwinds’ for minority groups” or that “operate to ‘freeze’ the status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices”).
337
Note that the disparate impact claim does not seek to rectify inequality in the
outcomes themselves; rather, like the disparate treatment claim, it is at bottom a
theory of unequal treatment. See, e.g., Pamela L. Perry, Two Faces of Disparate Impact Discrimination, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 523, 540-41 (1991).
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used to justify disparate impact claims in the employment context.
Outside that context, not even racial minorities are entitled in the
normal course to a finding of discrimination based solely on evidence
339
of outcome disparities. Second, the default presumption in the employment discrimination area is that, in a world with no discrimination, the “work force [will be] more or less representative of the racial[, gender,] and ethnic composition of the population in the
340
community from which employees are hired.” The same is not quite
true with respect to arbitration agreements and the set of all unconscionable agreements. There are real disparities in bargaining power
that frequently attend arbitration clauses held to be unconscionable—
disparities that serve as a compelling alternative explanation for the
341
outcome discrepancies identified by Randall and others. Third, the
342
343
FAA was designed to reverse the “hostility,” “enmity,” and “jealou344
sy” of the common law courts toward arbitration, not their unintended failure to enforce predispute arbitration agreements with the
same vigor they applied to other agreements. It has therefore been
345
understood as only “pre-emptive of state laws hostile to arbitration,”
as opposed to just any law that happens to impede the enforceability
of arbitration agreements. This, too, is consistent with my earlier description of the Paradigm as more akin to an “anti-oppression” rather
346
than an “anti-subordination” principle.
For these reasons, the pretextualists would do better to direct
their arguments toward a claim of disparate treatment: a claim that
judges applying the unconscionability defense sometimes intentionally
347
discriminate against arbitration.
In the anti-discrimination area, a
338

See Hasnas, supra note 74, at 475-77.
See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976).
340
Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 339 n.20.
341
See supra notes 299-02 and accompanying text.
342
Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 272 (1995); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 14 (1984).
343
Sec. Indus. Ass’n v. Connolly, 883 F.2d 1114, 1120 (1st Cir. 1989).
344
S. REP. NO. 68-536, at 2 (1924); Cohen & Dayton, supra note 17, at 283.
345
Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 112 (2001); see also Strausbaugh
v. H & R Block Fin. Advisors, Inc., No. 05-001083, 2007 WL 3122257, at *4 (Ky. Ct.
App. Oct. 26, 2007) (interpreting Circuit City as holding that the FAA preempts only
state laws hostile to arbitration); Wilson, supra note 180, at 813.
346
See supra notes 74-79 and accompanying text.
347
This is furthermore consistent with the pretextualists’ own suspicion of “hostility” and “disdain” in the way judges apply the unconscionability defense against arbitration. See McGuinness & Karr, supra note 180, at 61; Randall, supra note 298, at 186;
Riske, supra note 31, at 591.
339
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plaintiff seeking to prove either an equal protection claim or a statutory claim of disparate treatment need only establish intentional, unjustified discrimination on the basis of the prohibited characteristic
and adverse consequences resulting from it. Proof of disparate outcomes is, strictly speaking, neither necessary nor sufficient for this
348
The upshot for pretextualists is that the disparate treatpurpose.
ment framework can help them avoid some of the problems inherent
in making persuasive apples-to-apples comparisons between unconscionability outcomes in arbitration and nonarbitration cases.
The challenge, of course, is how to prove purposeful discrimination. Sometimes, a judge can scarcely conceal her distaste for
arbitration. In one case, Montana Supreme Court Justice Trieweiler
went out of his way to describe the “total lack of procedural safeguards” in arbitration and to accuse the Paradigm of “subvert[ing]
349
our system of justice as we have come to know it.”
In another, a
state judge described an arbitration clause between a consumer and a
large national bank as “yet another vignette in the timeless and constant effort by the haves to squeeze from the have nots even the last
drop” and to “design new devices and definitions to . . . [satisfy] their
350
These statements raise a strong
unquenchable thirst for profits.”
presumption of hostility toward arbitration, as several pretextualists
351
In most cases, however, there is no smoking
have already noted.
gun evidence of purposeful discrimination.
This is precisely where conceptual resources developed in the anti-discrimination area, again, prove helpful. Anti-discrimination law is
keenly attuned to the historical realities of prejudice and the difficul348

See supra note 339 and accompanying text; infra note 367.
Lombardi I, 886 P.2d 931, 940-41 (Mont. 1994) (Trieweiler, J., specially concurring), vacated, 515 U.S. 1129 (1995).
350
Lytle v. Citifinancial Servs., Inc., 810 A.2d 643, 658 n.8 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002),
overruled on other grounds by Salley v. Option One Mortg. Corp., 925 A.2d 115, 129 (Pa.
2007); see also Knepp v. Credit Acceptance Corp. (In re Knepp), 229 B.R. 821, 827
(Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1999) (“The reality that the average consumer frequently loses
his/her constitutional rights and right of access to the court . . . rises as a putrid odor
which is overwhelming to the body politic.”).
351
Randall and Bruhl have both made this point with reference to Justice Trieweiler’s remarks. See Bruhl, supra note 168, at 1459-60; Randall, supra note 298, at 220-21.
In other contexts, such obvious declarations of bias have been sufficient to prove
purposeful discrimination on the part of a trial court judge. For example, the Fourth
Circuit found an equal protection violation where a district court judge stated during
criminal sentencing that, although he was not supposed to sentence female defendants
more leniently than male defendants, “I’m old fashioned enough I just don’t believe in
punishing women who participate in a crime with the men on the same basis as a
man.” United States v. Maples, 501 F.2d 985, 986 (4th Cir. 1974).
349
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ties inherent in proving discriminatory purpose.
It has accordingly
devised helpful evidentiary and burden-shifting frameworks that facili353
tate the inference of status-based discrimination.
Thus, the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine test in the statutory discrimination area raises a presumption of intentional discrimination in cases
where all status-independent explanations for an adverse employment
decision (such as the lack of job-related qualifications) can be ruled
354
out.
Similarly, in the equal protection context, the factors set forth
355
in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.
help focus the factfinder’s inquiry on what the Court deems to be
telltale indicia of intentional discrimination. Examples of such factors
include governmental decisions that (1) wreak extreme disproportionate impact on a particular group, (2) are preceded by an unusual
sequence of events, or (3) are reached through departures from
356
None of these factors,
normal procedures or substantive rules.
alone or in combination, suggests intentional discrimination based on
suspect or quasi-suspect group membership any more than it suggests
357
But the Arlington
disorganization, neglect, or an aversion to rules.
Heights framework permits the factfinder to infer intent nonetheless,
in turn triggering heightened scrutiny, which has itself been described
as an heuristic for “flushing out” improper motives capable of con358
cealment behind ostensibly valid reasons.

352

See, e.g., Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505-06 (2005); Foster, supra note
335, at 1496-97.
353
See Foster, supra note 335, at 1479 (discussing the role of historical context in
the Court’s approach to disparate impact); Selmi, supra note 77, at 295
(“[D]iscrimination law has long been treated as a unique area of civil litigation that
requires proof structures and rules that are distinct from the rules and procedures that
govern other civil disputes.”).
354
See Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981) (citing
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Greene, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)). The burden of production then shifts to the defendant to disprove the inference by offering a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason. If the defendant discharges this burden, the plaintiff has an
opportunity to prove that the defendant’s explanation is a pretext. See id. at 256; see
also McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804-05.
355
429 U.S. 252 (1977).
356
See id. at 266-67 (identifying additional factors).
357
See Selmi, supra note 77, at 304-05; cf. Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of
Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1181 (1995) (making the same point in the statutory discrimination context).
358
See ELY, supra note 139, at 146; see also City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488
U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (“[T]he purpose of strict scrutiny is to ‘smoke out’ illegitimate
uses of race . . . .”).
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The rationale for the inference of intentional discrimination made
possible by these frameworks is that, given our collective history and
expectations, erratic, arbitrary, or unexplained behavior that tends to
359
disadvantage certain groups of persons is immediately suspicious.
Only with the force of this normative presumption—a presumption
that makes sense only in connection with “suspect” or “quasi-suspect”
classes—does proof of discriminatory purpose become an attainable
goal. To be sure, in the anti-discrimination area these frameworks
have been partially undermined by subsequent legal developments and
thus may not function in practice in quite the same way as they do in
theory. Nonetheless, the basic theory behind them is sound and can
still be applied in helpful ways in the FAA preemption context.
Distilling these insights, I propose the following test for determining whether a court has applied a general contract defense in a way
that stands as an obstacle to the Paradigm’s anti-discrimination
mandate: First, the defense must be of a type that “provid[es] ‘the op360
portunity for discrimination.’” More than any other general contract
defense, unconscionability meets this test. Second, the court’s unconscionability decision must rest on generalizations about arbitration’s in361
adequacy as a dispute resolution process, or must otherwise permit
the inference that the decision, “‘if otherwise unexplained, [is] more
362
likely than not based on the consideration of impermissible factors.’”
The opponent may defend the decision below either by disproving one of these preliminary factors (thereby denying the trial judge’s
intent to discriminate) or by conceding intentional discrimination but
363
offering a sound justification for it. In doing so, she may not simply
“presume that arbitration in and of itself is inferior to a court pro364
ceeding” or otherwise rely on generalizations about arbitration.
359

See Foster, supra note 335, at 1500, 1539-40; Selmi, supra note 77, at 297, 305-06.
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 95 (1986) (quoting Whitus v. Georgia, 385
U.S. 545, 552 (1967)); see also id. at 96 (observing that the practice must “permit[]
‘those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate’” (quoting Avery v. Georgia,
345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953))).
361
See supra notes 119-49 and accompanying text.
362
Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981) (quoting
Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978)); see also Batson, 476 U.S. at
93-96; Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-67
(1977) (identifying numerous circumstantial factors from which a purpose to discriminate might be inferred).
363
See supra notes 276-80 and accompanying text.
364
McGuinness & Karr, supra note 180, at 78; cf. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97-98 (holding
that a prosecutor may not rely on “assumptions, which arise solely from the jurors’
race” or on “general assertions” to the effect that she acted in good faith).
360
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Instead, she must point to objective facts about the particular
arbitration agreement at issue (or the arbitral process contemplated
by it) to demonstrate unconscionability. If the opponent fails to proffer the required explanation or to offer a sound justification, the reviewing court would be required to conclude that hostility toward arbitration motivated the application of the contract defense.
In developing this test, I was influenced in part by the framework
for proving intentional discrimination that the Court developed in
365
Batson v. Kentucky.
The context of Batson—discrimination by a
prosecutor in the use of peremptory challenges—may seem far
removed from disputes over arbitration clauses. But because lower
courts have applied the Batson framework to equal protection claims
brought against judges, who in many states are responsible for the
366
selection of grand juries, this line of cases represents the closest
functional analog to the situation here, in which the issue is whether a
trial judge has discriminated against arbitration in the application of a
general rule of contract.
In addition, Batson recognized that a “‘single invidiously discriminatory governmental act’” is sufficient to trigger an equal protection
violation; thus, the party claiming discrimination need not provide
evidence of “‘other comparable decisions’” and may instead “rely[]
367
solely on the facts concerning [juror] selection in his case.”
This
innovation helps steer the FAA preemption inquiry away from
outcome-based comparisons to the real issue of the true (rather than
pretextual) reasons why a court reaches a particular unconscionability
365

See 476 U.S. at 96-98. In the equal protection area, McClesky v. Kemp appears to
have significantly undercut Batson. See 481 U.S. 279, 319 (1987). Nonetheless, Batson
still provides a useful model for decoding pretextual discrimination against arbitration
in the unconscionability context.
366
See, e.g., Ramseur v. Beyer, 983 F.2d 1215, 1222-23 (3d Cir. 1992) (describing
the process of grand jury selection by a New Jersey judge).
367
Batson, 476 U.S. at 95 (quoting Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266 n.14). This
was Batson’s chief innovation. It effectively relieved criminal defendants of the burden
to prove that “‘in case after case, whatever the circumstances, whatever the crime and
whoever the defendant or the victim may be,’” the prosecutor had systematically struck
jurors based on their protected-class status. Id. at 91-92 (quoting Swain v. Alabama,
380 U.S. 202, 223 (1965)).
In a related vein, the Second Circuit has held that a female employee could prevail
on a gender-based § 1983 claim even though she had failed to produce evidence that
similarly situated male employees were treated differently. See Back v. Hastings on
Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 121 (2d Cir. 2004). “‘[T]he ultimate issue,’” the court explained, “‘is the reasons for the individual plaintiff’s treatment, not
the relative treatment of different groups within the workplace.’” Id. (quoting Brown v.
Henderson, 257 F.3d 246, 252 (2d Cir. 2001)).
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decision.
Finally, Batson involved discretionary decisionmaking
(peremptory challenges) that, like the unconscionability doctrine,
carries a potential for abuse.
Several qualifications are in order. First, the test should set a high
bar. If it is difficult to establish discriminatory intent in the context of
race, it should be equally, if not more so, in the arbitration context.
The stakes here are not nearly as high as they are in cases of invidious
discrimination based on suspect or quasi-suspect classifications. And
although race “correlates so weakly with the legitimate characteristics
368
for which it might be used as a proxy,” the same is not necessarily
369
true for arbitration.
Second, because it would not be feasible or desirable to hold an
evidentiary hearing or to voir dire the trial judge who made the initial
unconscionability determination, the issue of whether the trial court
applied a general contract defense against arbitration in a discriminatory fashion should be treated as a question of law that may be de370
cided de novo based on the trial court record alone.
Reasonable minds can certainly disagree about the lines I have
drawn. As with the test put forward in Part III, I offer this test as a
conversation starter rather than as a finished product. For my
purposes, the content of any proposed rule is less important than the
latent considerations that the rule helps bring to the surface.
D. Application
Several courts have held arbitration clauses presumptively un371
conscionable when they do not evince a “modicum of bilaterality” or

368

Brest, supra note 114, at 11.
See supra notes 329-34 and accompanying text.
370
This is consistent with well-settled law to the effect that de novo review is appropriate for federal preemption questions and for the interpretation of the intent
behind legal instruments such as statutes or contracts. See, e.g., City of Auburn v. Qwest
Corp., 247 F.3d 966, 977 (9th Cir. 2001) (observing that because preemption is a question of law, “[n]o further factual record would narrow or clarify that issue”), rev’d on
other grounds, 260 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir. 2001); Parks v. State, 247 P.3d 857, 859 (Wyo.
2011) (“‘Statutory interpretation is a question of law. Our paramount consideration is
the legislature’s intent as reflected in the plain and ordinary meaning of the words
used in the statute.’” (quoting Sorensen v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co., 234 P.3d 1233,
1237 (Wyo. 2010))).
371
Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 692 (Cal.
2000); see also Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1149-50 (9th Cir. 2003). The party defending the agreement may rebut the Armendariz presumption if it can prove a “business realit[y]” necessitating nonmutual terms. See Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 692.
369
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372

“mutuality of obligation.” A typical example is a clause that requires
the adherent to arbitrate her claims but does not impose the same requirement on the drafter. Pretextualists argue that the requirement
of mutuality is a ruse behind which judges hide their continuing hostility toward arbitration. They reason that nonmutual bargains are
generally not considered unconscionable outside the arbitration context and, moreover, that this fact standing alone proves discrimination
373
against arbitration.
But there may be perfectly good reasons why nonmutual dispute
resolution agreements should be deemed more unconscionable than
nonmutual agreements about, say, sales terms. For example, an arbitration clause that provides for one party to select two out of three
neutrals is much more likely to strike us as unfair than a sales term
that provides for one party to shoulder two-thirds of the costs. Unlike existing approaches, therefore, the anti-discrimination model
would require the pretextualists to make a threshold showing of intentional hostility toward arbitration—aided, of course, by an evidentiary framework of the sort I have proposed that would allow
them to infer intentional disparate treatment from unexplained, inaccurate, or unusual aspects of the court’s unconscionability ruling.
As an illustration of how the anti-discrimination model might
work in this context, consider the California Supreme Court’s deci374
sion in Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, a decision
that remains controversial today. In Armendariz, the court announced
that “an arbitration agreement imposed in an adhesive context lacks
basic fairness and mutuality if it requires one contracting party, but
375
It accordingly upheld the
not the other, to arbitrate all claims.”
lower court’s unconscionability determination and refused to find the
determination preempted by the FAA, reasoning that unconscionability is part of the general law of contracts. How would Armendariz be
decided under a test of the sort I propose?
The proponent—here, the employer-defendant—would have little trouble establishing the first prong of my test because unconscio-

372

Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Distajo, 66 F.3d 438, 451 (2d Cir. 1995); see also Lytle v.
Citifinancial Servs., Inc., 810 A.2d 643, 663 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002), overruled on other
grounds by Salley v. Option One Mortg. Corp., 925 A.2d 115, 129 (Pa. 2007); Iwen v.
U.S. W. Direct, 977 P.2d 989, 996 (Mont. 1999).
373
See McGuinness & Karr, supra note 180, at 82; Randall, supra note 298, at 207.
374
6 P.3d 669 (Cal. 2000).
375
Id. at 694.
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nability is susceptible to discriminatory application.
Thus, the issue turns on whether the court’s decision was based on biases or generalizations about arbitration, or whether there is something else
about the totality of the circumstances that warrants an inference of
377
unjustified discrimination.
One indication of bias is the court’s characterization of the arbitration clause as “requir[ing]” or “obligat[ing]” the employees to arbi378
trate but relieving the employer from the same constraints.
This
characterization appears to mask a value judgment, for although the
arbitration clause required the employees to arbitrate their claims, it
also denied that same option to the employer. Like the employees,
the employer had no choice of dispute resolution options because the
employees never agreed to arbitrate the employer’s claims, only their
own. Where each side has no option but to use one form of dispute
resolution, the employer is no less “requir[ed]” or “obligat[ed]” to litigate than the employees are to arbitrate—unless, of course, one presumes that arbitration is inherently undesirable or inadequate compared with litigation. As the pretextualists have noted, the holding in
Armendariz appears to be based almost entirely assumptions about arbi379
tration’s inferiority as a dispute resolution forum.
Moreover, there are other telltale signs of hostility in the court’s
opinion. For example, the court did not bother to look at whether
the parties’ particular arbitration clause was so one-sided as to
380
“shock[] the conscience.”
Instead, the court relied on what it perceived as “the inherent shortcomings of arbitration—limited discov-

376

See supra note 360 and accompanying text.
See supra note 362 and accompanying text.
378
Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 691-92, 694; see also Ticknor v. Choice Hotels Int’l, Inc.,
265 F.3d 931, 940 (9th Cir. 2001) (“The arbitration clause in this case allowed Choice to
bring its claims against Ticknor into state or federal court, yet forced Ticknor to submit
all claims to binding arbitration at Choice’s headquarters in Maryland.” (emphasis
added)); Iwen, 977 P.2d at 996 (“[I]t makes no sense for one party . . . to have the freedom to seek the remedy before a court of law, while the other party . . . is forced to seek
the same remedy only through arbitration.” (emphasis added)).
379
See Broome, supra note 180, at 41 (arguing that California courts are biased
against arbitration); Burton, supra note 30, at 488-90 (arguing that Armendariz and other cases show bias against arbitration).
380
2A LAWRENCE, supra note 319, § 2-302:27; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. b (1981) (describing an unconscionable contract as one “‘such
as no man in his senses and not under delusion would make’” (quoting Hume v. United
States, 132 U.S. 406, 411 (1889))). Although the court went on to consider the limitation-on-damages provision in the arbitration clause, it noted that this provision merely
“compounded” the unconscionability of the clause. Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 694.
377
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ery, limited judicial review, limited procedural protections.”
As we
have seen, although it is a fair generalization that discovery and appellate review are not available in arbitration as they are in litigation, it
would be a mistake to conclude that these shortcomings are necessarily “inherent” in arbitration, or indeed that they are “shortcomings” at
382
These common features of arbitration can be, and often have
all.
383
been, varied by agreement. Moreover, there is significant dissensus
as to whether full-blown discovery is in fact so essential to fair and effective dispute resolution such that its unavailability should be consi384
dered a shortcoming rather than a virtue. The decision in Armendariz was based solely on these and other suspect assumptions—
assumptions that the court frankly conceded were “disadvantages that
385
may exist” for plaintiffs in arbitration.
At this point in the test, the opponent-employee would have the
opportunity to refer to specific aspects of the Armendariz opinion or to
facts in the record that tend either to dispel the biased assumptions implicit in the court’s reasoning, or otherwise to justify the court’s unconscionability decision. It is not sufficient simply to declare, as did the
Armendariz court, that “[t]he application of [the unconscionability]
386
principle to arbitration does not disfavor arbitration.”
Nor would it
be adequate to rely on generalized denials or conclusory statements.
Given the facts of Armendariz, it appears unlikely that the opponent
could successfully rebut the presumption of intentional discrimination.
Under the test I propose, the result in Armendariz would not compel
the same outcome in another controversial case from the California
381

Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 691. The court also relied on anecdotal evidence for the
proposition that “courts and juries are viewed as more likely to adhere to the law and
less likely than arbitrators to ‘split the difference’ between the two sides, thereby lowering damages awards for plaintiffs.” Id. at 693.
382
See supra notes 143-49.
383
See supra note 127.
384
See, e.g., Javier H. Rubinstein, International Commercial Arbitration: Reflections at the
Crossroads of the Common Law and Civil Law Traditions, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 303, 304 (2004)
(“It is difficult to overstate the horror with which parties and counsel outside the United
States view the prospect of American-style discovery . . . .”); Edward F. Sherman, Transnational Perspectives Regarding the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 56 J. LEGAL EDUC. 510, 51718 (2006) (discussing weaknesses of the American discovery process); Ralph K. Winter,
In Defense of Discovery Reform, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 263, 264, 275-78 (1992) (discussing the
need for and benefits of discovery reform). See generally Wayne D. Brazil, The Adversary
Character of Civil Discovery: A Critique and Proposals for Change, 31 VAND. L. REV. 1295
(1978) (criticizing abusive discovery practices as costly and counterproductive to the
search for truth in litigation).
385
Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 692 (emphasis added).
386
Id. at 693.
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courts. Like Armendariz, Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc. involved a nonmutual
387
arbitration clause. Although the court found the clause to be unconscionable, it did so for reasons that were not necessarily predicated on
arbitration’s inferiority to litigation. For example, the court found several other features of the arbitration clause problematic, such as a limitation on remedies, a shortened statute of limitations, and a waiver of de388
fective service. It concluded that the clause was “unconscionably onesided and unfair in numerous respects,” not just in the way it reserved
389
Without more, these facts
access to the courts for only one party.
would be insufficient to raise a durable inference of discrimination.
A variant of the nonmutual arbitration clause in Armendariz and
Stirlen is one that gives the drafting party a choice of forums (arbitration or litigation) but restricts the adherent to only one (typically arbi390
tration). Here one might argue that the unilateral right to choose a
forum after a dispute arises gives one party an unfair tactical advantage over the other—an advantage that is so one-sided as to shock the
conscience. An unconscionability finding based on this rationale
would not “necessarily express the impermissible view that arbitration
391
Absent other facts, therefore, it too would
is inferior to litigation.”
not be preempted.
CONCLUSION
The Court’s FAA preemption jurisprudence is undeniably organized around an anti-discrimination principle—a principle that only
requires the preemption of state laws that intentionally and unjustifiably discriminate against arbitration agreements. The best interpretation of that principle is that state laws singling out arbitration on their
387

60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138, 152 (Ct. App. 1997).
Id. at 142-43.
389
Id. at 159.
390
See, e.g., Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 379 F.3d 159, 170
(5th Cir. 2004) (“The cases do not necessarily express the impermissible view that arbitration is inferior to litigation, for a choice of remedies is better than being limited to one
forum.”); E-Z Cash Advance, Inc. v. Harris, 60 S.W.3d 436, 442 (Ark. 2001) (refusing to
uphold an arbitration clause giving the drafter, but not the adherent, the option to sue in
court or arbitration); State ex rel. Dunlap v. Berger, 567 S.E.2d 265, 284 (W. Va. 2002)
(refusing to uphold a contract where defendant “t[ied] substantively unconscionable exculpatory and limitation of liability provisions in a form contract of adhesion”).
391
Iberia Credit, 379 F.3d at 170. Nonetheless, preemption might be proper if the
unconscionability finding were shown to be based largely on negative assumptions
about arbitration or were tainted with other indications of bias. See, e.g., Dunlap, 567
S.E.2d at 271, 280 n.12 (presuming that a sole arbitrator selected by an employer
would be biased).
388
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face trigger at most a suspicion that they are based on improper preconceptions about arbitration’s inferiority compared to litigation.
Applications of general contract rules that rely on biases or generalizations about arbitration and that render arbitration agreements unenforceable are suspect for the same reason. These are the ways in
which I claim that arbitration deserves “suspect” status.
Understanding arbitration’s “suspect” status makes possible a new,
more robust approach to FAA preemption. In this Article, I have attempted to sketch the foundations of such an approach and to use it
both to critique and offer solutions to two important problems in the
Court’s existing preemption paradigm: over- and underpreemption.
But many questions remain to be answered and many more details
need to be embellished before such an approach can earn a place in
392
the pantheon of FAA preemption theories. This is just one of many
possible starting points for what I hope will become a fertile avenue of
scholarship and debate.

392

I pursue some of these questions in my forthcoming article. See Aragaki, supra
note 27.

